Standing Committee B

[Mr. Eric Illsley in the Chair]

Criminal Justice Bill

Clause 217 - Meaning of ''fixed-term prisoner''

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: I wonder whether the Minister could enlighten me. The definition of ''prison'' in clause 217(2) is
''any place where a person serving such a sentence is liable to be detained.''
 What do the words ''is liable to'' mean in that context? Why does the clause not refer simply to a place where a person is detained under the terms of clause 217(1)?

Graham Allen: This part of the Bill on the release of prisoners on licence is welcome and the Government are doing precisely what is needed. However, although what the clause means will be evident to judges and lawyers, unfortunately, the public are missing out yet again. We are in danger of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory because having introduced the positive concept of custody plus, we are putting it to the public as imprisonment minus. We all seem to agree on the concepts in the chapter relating to the release of prisoners on licence, but I wonder whether we could not phrase the provisions in such a way that would enable the ordinary member of the public to understand them.
 It is the old cliché; offenders get 12 months but are out after six. The chapter turns that round so that an offender will get six months but must keep his nose clean for another six. In their wording, the Government have failed to recognise that they need to change the public's perception. I tabled amendment No. 919, which, sadly, was not selected, but in which I defined ''sentence'' as the term of imprisonment, plus that which was served in the community or on licence. Until the terms are clear, not only for the Committee and for judges but for the public, the sentencing process will lack credibility. I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to bring the public's perception in line with reality, so that a member of the public down at the Dog and Duck does not have to engage in judicial archaeology to understand why an individual leaves prison after six months. We can explain that honestly, and I hope that the Minister will do so. Otherwise, instead of calling the chapter ''Release of prisoners on licence'', we should call it ''The dishonest sentencing section.'' We need to restore that honesty, otherwise we shall be talking to ourselves and not involving members of the public in their criminal justice system.

Hilary Benn: Let me say to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath)
 that if the word ''liable'' was not used, it would suggest that the definition depended on the offender being present in prison. If we stop to think about it, we will realise that that is not always so—for instance, when offenders are released on temporary licence. That is why the word is necessary. The definition of a fixed term of imprisonment encompasses all those serving a sentence for a determinate term and those under the age of 18 serving either an extended sentence for certain violent or sexual offences or a sentence of detention for non-dangerous offenders convicted of a serious offence.
 I was much taken by the phrase ''judicial archaeology'' used by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). For good reasons, the Committee has often been engaged in that. I am at one with my hon. Friend in wishing the public to have a better understanding of how sentencing works. That is why, in those clauses already agreed to, we made provision for the court to explain exactly what a sentence means. 
 My hon. Friend touched on an important point when speaking of the difference between sentence and custody. People are confused about it. The sentence is the entire period; it consists of the time spend in custody and the period on licence. However, as my hon. Friend knows, if people fail to adhere to their licence conditions, they are liable to recall, which means that they will have to serve the rest of the sentence in custody. I agree with him that the public need a better understanding of how the system works. 
 I hope that the requirement for the courts to explain sentences and how they work, and some of the other things that we debated earlier such as the work of the Sentencing Guidelines Council, will begin to move us towards what my hon. Friend wants to achieve, with which we all agree—namely, a better understanding of what happens, and why and how it happens. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 217 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 218 - Power of court to recommend licence

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 908, in
clause 218, page 120, line 17, leave out 'particular' and insert 'reasonable'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 724, in 
clause 218, page 120, line 19, at end insert 
 'and shall tell the offender when passing sentence what conditions are to be recommended and shall give the defendant an opportunity to make representations.'.
 No. 907, in 
clause 218, page 120, line 21, leave out 'have regard to' and insert 'consider in full'.

David Heath: Under the amendment, when passing sentence, a court may recommend to the Secretary of State reasonable conditions that could be included in any licence that is granted. However, that does not
 exclude the possibility of particularity. I hope that the conditions imposed would not be general but specific to the prisoner. It is important, however, that the conditions can reasonably be complied with by the offender. Otherwise, they would presage an automatic return to custody. I would be entirely satisfied if the Minister were to tell me that the condition of reasonableness could be applied in another way. I am not sure that it is, and the amendment therefore seems reasonable. It makes clear the context in which the conditions would be set.
 Amendment No. 907 is self-explanatory. It would apply when the Secretary of State was exercising his powers under section 229(3)(b), as it would allow him to introduce other conditions from time to time. It cannot be right that the Executive consider it in a vacuum, outwith what is already the sober consideration of the court. It is self-evident that the Secretary of State, in applying those conditions, must properly have regard for the conditions originally applied by the court. It is a matter of emphasis and degree rather than a change in meaning of the terms of the clause, in that it would be made explicit that the Secretary of State must consider as a matter of overriding importance the views of the court in the first place, rather than any discretion that he might accrue to himself. That brings us back to the central issues of the Executive's role in sentencing, and its tendency to overreach itself in that respect. We shall come back to that argument later, and we have touched on it already. The amendment is the very smallest of nudges in the direction of the discretion of Secretary of State in taking fully into account the views of the court at the first point of sentencing.

Graham Allen: It tells you something about me, Mr. Illsley, that in my diary I carry not only a picture of my wife and daughter, but a dog-eared piece of The Guardian that I ripped out about two years ago, because the facts it described stunned me and I felt that I could not be without it. It says that
''the 100,000 hard cases share identifiable problems which can be tackled. These problems include the fact that half are under 21; nearly two-thirds are hard drug users; more than a third were in care as children and half have no school qualifications at all.''
 The quotation ends rather cryptically: 
''Mr. Blair has told colleagues that the figures are 'shocking'.''
 I shall not delay the Committee unduly on the matter, except to say that when we are considering conditions that should be attached to licences we should surely examine some of those root causes of crime and what the courts can do to tackle them. That is why I tabled amendments Nos. 109 and 110, which were not called, but which ask the court to take into account factors such as 
''the attainment of emotional maturity, social skills, and in the case of parents, parenting skills'',
 and 
''the attainment of educational and employment qualifications.''
 If the court does not bear such matters in mind as part of the conditions that are attached to a licence it is, in my view, being negligent, because it is just recycling 
 offenders through the courts system, rather than tackling the root causes. 
 The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) probably has more experience of daily dealings with such people than any of us, and must have come to the same conclusion as I have. Many of these people are poorly qualified, inadequate, unsuccessful and lacking in emotional intelligence, if not basic intelligence. One way to crack the recycling of offenders is to break that circle and give those offenders something that they can grasp. That is why I raise with the Minister the issue of ensuring that the courts, in deciding on licensing conditions, pay more attention than is currently provided for in the Bill to what they can get offenders to aspire to and get better at, so that they can be more adequate people, make more of a contribution and come out with qualifications.

Humfrey Malins: Let me say how much I agree with the hon. Gentleman in relation to his comments about the problems that some defendants awaiting sentence face. He is right to paint the picture he did—it is extremely accurate.
 Amendment No. 724 would require the court to 
''tell the offender when passing sentence what conditions are to be recommended and . . . give the defendant an opportunity to make representations'',
 and is no more than a probing amendment. It has not hitherto been the practice of the judiciary to talk much about licences, which have been an afterthought. Perhaps that has been a mistake, inasmuch as hitherto the judiciary has simply said, ''Bloggs, you will serve 18 months. Half of that will be served and after that you will be released on licence, but if you muck around under licence you will go back again. End of story; bring me the next case.'' 
 That might not be good enough. I understand what the Government are saying. However, will the judge not require much extra information about the defendant before passing comment about licence conditions? Will he require separate reports? Will there be any cost implications about which we should be concerned, and would it not be a good thing for the judge to explain to the defendant in simple language what conditions he is going to recommend, just in case the defence or its legal team has anything to say about the conditions? That is the only reason for my probing amendment. I also note that the clause refers to the fact that the judge ''may'' as opposed to ''must''. Am I right in thinking that that gives the judge an option that might or might not be exercised depending on the mood of the judge and the suitability of that position for that judge on that day?

Hilary Benn: I, too, concur with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North about the importance of addressing the circumstances that give rise to offending. In many of the prisons that I have visited in my present capacity, I have seen good programmes at work. I think of one in particular—talking of parenting—that I saw recently in Wandsworth prison. It had had a remarkable impact on the offenders in getting them to think about their relationships with their families in a way that, they
 hoped, would change the way in which they lived their lives when they came out of prison. The hon. Member for Woking is right in divining the purpose of the clause. Some courts do pass comment on what they think would be appropriate licence conditions. There is no formal mechanism for that to be communicated. He is also right that it is a permissive power. That is why the clause says ''may''—the judge decides whether it is appropriate to pass comment depending on the circumstances of the case. I share the objective of the amendment, which is to ensure that there is communication with the offender and to allow for representations to be made, but I think that we can achieve it administratively.
 We anticipate that any court recommendation as to licence would form part of the court's reasons for sentence, and would therefore be heard by the offender in open court. That would be the most effective way of ensuring communication with the offender. However, it would not be appropriate for the offender to make representations to the court against such a recommendation at that point, because it would be only a recommendation, which the Secretary of State must have regard to, but it might not, in the end, form part of the offender's release package. By the time the offender was released—that could be years down the line, depending on the length of the custodial sentence—the risks and needs might have changed sufficiently to render the original court recommendation irrelevant. For example, the judge might have recommended as a licence condition that the offender should keep away from person X. That person might, sadly, have passed on. 
 Many circumstances could change, which would mean that it was not sensible to make representations at that point. Nevertheless, the offender would be perfectly entitled to speak or write to his probation officer to pass comment as to whether the court's recommendations were as acceptable, and to give reasons. For a determinate sentence of more than 12 months, that could form part of the probation service's consideration of appropriate licence conditions, which must be sent to a prison governor four weeks before the offender's release. 
 For an offender serving any part of a sentence requiring the Parole Board's decision on release—an extended sentence, imprisonment for public protection, which we were debating this morning, and life sentence—there will be formal opportunities for the offender to make representations as to the licence conditions, because the probation service prepares and sends the parole dossier, which includes any prior representations made by the prisoner against the court's recommendations to the Parole Board. The recommendations must be disclosed to the offender and the Parole Board will hold an oral hearing that the offender will attend, so there is an opportunity before and at the oral hearing to make representations. I hope that that meets the objective of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. 
 Amendment No. 908 would 
''leave out 'particular' and insert 'reasonable'.''
 I am not attracted to it for two reasons. One, the insertion of ''reasonable'' could be taken to suggest that somehow courts might be inclined to impose unreasonable conditions, whereas courts have a duty always to act reasonably. Secondly, it would lose particularity; it would take away the sense that courts should be specific in their recommendations. That is what the clause tries to capture. 
 Amendment No. 907 suggests that we 
''leave out 'have regard to' and insert 'consider in full'.''
 However, subsection (3) makes it clear that the court's recommendation is not part of the sentence passed on an offender. In one sense, changing ''have regard to'' to ''consider in full'' is not enormously significant, and considerable time may have elapsed before the Secretary of State considers a court's recommendations when making his decision on the appropriate licence conditions. In such circumstances, requiring the Secretary of State to ''have regard to'' the court's recommendation—time might have altered circumstances considerably—is reasonable.

David Heath: I am most grateful to the Minister for his response. I intimated in my earlier remarks that I felt that amendment No. 907 did not make a huge difference to the meaning of the clause. With regard to amendment No. 908, I did not want to lose the notion of particularity that the Minister took pains to explain, and I accept that the amendment could lead to such an interpretation. A court could make conditions that are entirely reasonable in every respect apart from the fact that an offender will be unable to keep to them for reasons beyond his control. That concerns me. However, it is not a major difference between us because, as the Minister says, one expects courts to behave reasonably when imposing sentence, and I am sure that they would take such a view not when setting conditions but when making recommendations about conditions. That is in any case tempered by the judgment when the conditions are applied.

Graham Allen: I thank the Minister for his warm words about being tough on the causes of crime while an offender is in custody or on licence. I look forward to those warm words being translated into cold print, perhaps in the other place.

David Heath: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 218 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 219 - The Parole Board

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 909, in
clause 219, page 121, line 10, leave out subsection (5).

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 910, in
clause 219, page 121, line 14, leave out subsection (6).

David Heath: This is an opportunity for the Government to be absolutely clear about their intentions towards the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Stafford and compatibility with human rights legislation, and towards the House of
 Lords in the case of Anderson. There was a clear indication that the Home Secretary's immediate reaction to those judgments was to seek to reintroduce the Home Secretary's role in dealing with the Parole Board on early release. It is not explicit in the Bill that it will do that job. There is fuzziness in the Government's approach as to whether the Bill is the vehicle that they have chosen—as they would say—to rectify that omission. We would say that an anomaly in the present situation will continue. It is entirely sensible to ask the Minister whether he believes that this is the vehicle to rectify the omission. If it is not, when does he intend to rectify it? Moreover, why has he not used the Bill to do so, given the clear intention that the Home Secretary expressed after the judgments in question were made?
 Subsections (5) and (6) would give the Home Secretary a degree of control over the Parole Board. It is at least debatable that that degree of control would be in excess of that which is compatible with human rights legislation. The clause might be subject to further challenge if it were found that that power had been used inappropriately. 
 First, the Minister must satisfy the Committee that what he is doing deals—or does not deal—with the situation. Secondly, if it is not intended to deal with it, does it not give the Home Secretary an inappropriately strong role in the Parole Board's proceedings? If the Minister does not believe that to be the case, why does he believe that? Why does he believe that for the Home Secretary to exercise that power in future would not fall foul of precisely the same legal findings of incompatibility as his previous intervention?

Hilary Benn: My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary indicated after the Stafford judgment that he intends to review the directions on the release of prisoners serving life sentences, with a view to strengthening them. The answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is that there is no legal impediment to the Home Secretary setting down directions, as long as they are compliant. I should point out that the Home Secretary is responsible for criminal justice policy, and is accountable to Parliament for all aspects of that policy. He is also, ultimately, responsible for the supervision of all offenders on licence and answerable to Parliament in respect of their release arrangements. It is therefore wholly reasonable that he should be able to set down the considerations that are to be taken into account when determining whether to grant early release.
 However, that does not give the Home Secretary unfettered discretion to set down excessive or unreasonable criteria that must be met before release can be granted. All directions must be compliant with article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 The rules that the Home Secretary may make have no influence on the determination of applications for early release. They offer a procedural framework within which the Parole Board works when it sits in a quasi-judicial capacity in the form of oral hearings. Although the Home Office draws up the rules, the Parole Board is always fully consulted. 
 Therefore we accept entirely that directions, in order to be lawful, must be compliant with article 6.

David Heath: That was not an entirely convincing argument.

Hilary Benn: It was not bad.

David Heath: I was listening carefully, and I hoped that the Minister was going to make a more clinching point than simply saying that the proposal was not necessary. I remain to be convinced, as, I suspect, does my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), that the Government are addressing the issues raised by the judgments, or that the power to intervene is necessary bearing in mind the need for the independence of the Parole Board in exercising its functions. Having said that, we are likely to return to the matter. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 219 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 15 - The Parole Board: supplementary provisions

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 726, in
schedule 15, page 224, line 8, after 'held', insert 'part-time or full-time'.
 The schedule addresses the membership of the Parole Board. The amendment is a minor one; it sets out who should be members of the board. It would be wise to widen the provisions of paragraph 2(2)(a) to include a person who holds or has held judicial office part-time or full-time. I say that because some distinguished silks have never wanted to take full-time judicial office. They might enjoy their lives as silks so much that they do not want to do so. When they retire they are just as distinguished as many who hold full-time judicial office. They might have sat part-time over many years and be just as experienced as many full-time judges. It might be worth considering part-time judicial office holders as well as full-time ones when choosing Parole Board members. This is a harmless amendment. I am not in much doubt that it will find favour with the Government.

Hilary Benn: The amendment is so harmless that the Bill already provides for the proposal. The schedule provides for both full-time and part-time members of the judiciary to be appointed as members of the Parole Board. Indeed, on occasion, recorders have been appointed, although at present the board's members are either High Court or circuit judges. The situation that the hon. Gentleman wants to facilitate has existed in the past and the Bill's wording will permit it in the future.

Humfrey Malins: I am most grateful. This has been a worthwhile debate, not least—I am desperately thinking of a reason why it has been worth while—because people outside the building read the reports of our proceedings. Those who might have found the provision unclear—foolishly, because it is so obvious—would not be unclear now. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Schedule 15 agreed to.

Clause 220 - Crediting of periods of remand in custody:

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 725, in
clause 220, page 122, line 3, leave out subsection (5).
 This deals with periods of remand in custody. I want to probe the Minister on the point. When it comes to sentencing, courts sometimes have huge difficulties in assessing whether remand periods in custody should be taken into account. Subsection (5) requires it to be stated in open court the number of days for which the offender was remanded in custody and the number of days in relation to which the direction is given. There are problems with that in practice. 
 It is not uncommon for a defendant to come before the court remanded in custody from different courts in connection with four or five different matters at once, and for the court to be totally unable to unravel the true position. A sentence of a certain number of months might be passed, but it be difficult for the court to comment in public on what account it took of time spent on remand in custody, because the court cannot be aware of all the custodial provisions that have applied to a defendant before, or even of those current at the time of sentence. There is a real nuts and bolts, practical problem, and if the Minister knows a simple way of calculating periods of remand, I should be grateful to hear it.

David Heath: I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. The problem seems to lie in the fact that subsection (5)(a) is expressed in such absolute terms. It is not wrong for the court to make clear the process of calculation that it used to make the direction. It is not inappropriate, therefore, that it should indicate the number of days in custody that it has considered in making its recommendations, but whether it is an absolute term or the number of days for which the offender was remanded in custody for that particular offence is a totally different matter. It seems that it must be possible to find a common course between the intention of the clause and the difficulties highlighted by the hon. Gentleman. Perhaps the Minister would consider a slight variation in the terms of subsection (5)(a).

Hilary Benn: The clause re-enacts, with some amendments, provisions in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. It provides for time spent in custody on remand to count towards time that would otherwise be spent in custody post sentence. I accept the point made by the hon. Member for Woking, but the clause aims to simplify provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1967, the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 for calculating remand time because, as we have heard, the current framework has caused difficulties in translating the sentence of the court into a period of custody.
 Subsection (3) requires the court to direct that the number of days for which the offender was remanded in custody will count as time served by him as part of his sentence, subject to the exceptions listed in subsection (4). Subsection (4) enables the court to 
 disregard the provisions in the clause where the Secretary of State has made rules regarding specific situations or where the court believes that it is just in all the circumstances to do so. Where a direction is not given, or is given but falls short of the full period spent on remand, subsection (6) requires the court to state openly its justification. I hope that, in those circumstances, the clause will go some way towards meeting the problems to which hon. Gentlemen have referred.

Humfrey Malins: I hope so. I do not want the matter to slip through because we have not properly scrutinised the clause. I take it that the Minister is saying that, when the court decides not to state the number of days for which the defendant was remanded in custody that will count towards his sentence, it will have absolute discretion not to come out with this diatribe if it does not wish to do so. I hope that that is the case and that the court will have the fullest possible discretion, because, otherwise, impossible situations could arise.
 For example, someone is arrested for an offence on 7 October and kept in custody for seven days—or even for one day. He then goes before the court and is remanded in custody for a week. A week later, there is a successful bail application, and the defendant is released on terms. Then, as often happens, he commits three different offences in the jurisdiction of three different courts. He is brought back to court and pleads guilty forthwith at the court at which he had hitherto appeared and, through his lawyers, tells the court that he is appearing at another court next Tuesday and has not decided which way to plead, and at another on the Wednesday, where he thinks that he will be remanded in custody, although he is not sure. The sentencer then puts off the case for pre-sentence reports. By the time another tribunal has heard the case, a further month later, it is the devil's own job to unravel which periods of custody are relevant. Such matters are much better dealt with outside the court. However, if the court has the discretion to which the Minister has referred, I am pleased to hear it.

Hilary Benn: I am happy to confirm that the court has such discretion. That is the purpose of subsection (4)(b).

Humfrey Malins: In that case, I am surprised that it says that the court must pronounce, subject to a discretion that it does not want to pronounce because it does not feel like it. There seems to be an inconsistency: either it should pronounce or it should not—in which case the clause would be unnecessary. The point has been made, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 220 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 221 - Effect of direction under section 220

Amendment made: No. 553, in 
clause 221, page 122, line 46, leave out 'or a custodial period'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 221, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 222 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 223 - Persons extradited to the United Kingdom

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: To parade my ignorance, will the Minister explain subsection (3)? What is the position of people who might be in Crown dependent territories, who are not covered by the category of British overseas territory? Are they included in the United Kingdom if they are brought back for trial from the bailiwicks of Guernsey, Jersey or the Isle on Man? I believe that the Isle of Man is not part of the United Kingdom. If the Minister can confirm the situation, my mind will be at rest.

Hilary Benn: I shall take advice on the question raised by the hon. Gentleman and respond to him in writing.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 223 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 224 - Duty to release prisoners

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Graham Allen: I continue the campaign for honest sentencing. Subsection (3)(a) seems to contradict itself. In defining ''the requisite custodial period'', the provision says that
''in relation to a person serving a sentence of imprisonment for a term of twelve months or more'',
 that means one half of his sentence. Rather than stating that there will be a 12-month sentence and then that the person will serve only six months, why are we not honest? Why do we not say that they will serve six months? If the other six months were served under the licence provisions, people would not say that those sentenced to 12 months were being let out after six, but would instead realise that they had served their sentence, that they would be constrained under licence for a further six months, and that if they broke its conditions they would go back into custody. Then we would genuinely have custody plus rather than imprisonment minus. 
 We all agree that that is the right way to proceed but the public perceive that we are somehow letting people out early. Instead, we should impose onerous constraints on such people once they have served an appropriate sentence. I think that we would all agree that, in those circumstances, that should honestly and actually be six months.

Simon Hughes: I am very keen that statements should be made in court that people can understand. I look at it slightly differently from the hon. Gentleman, but wish for the same effect. I have said before that the
 benefit of the Government's policy is that, in effect, sentences will have two halves—an inside half and an outside half. We need to make it clear what judges should say.
 There should be a formula, so that whatever else they might say about the crime and the trial, judges will have to say something that makes it clear that the sentence is in two halves—for instance, they may say, ''You will be sentenced by the court to three years. Half of that time will be spent inside, and the second half will be spend outside on licence; you will therefore expect to be released on such and such a date. If you reoffend after that, you can expect to go back inside.'' 
 I do not think that there is very much between the hon. Member for Nottingham, North and me, but I am equally clear that sentencing has been thoroughly confusing for some years, and it is not helpful. 
 We shall soon come to discuss home detention curfews, a subject that raises separate but perfectly proper and important issues. The Government know that we are generally supportive. I am keen that the Minister should let judges know, if he has not done so already, that he is willing to talk to them about a formula that makes clear what the sentence is, the minimum time inside and the fact that coming out again is not the end of the sentence, but part 2 of the sentence. 
 The Minister knows well that the logic of doing that is strengthened because it would also allow judges to say, with more credibility, ''You will get a sentence of custody, plus a sentence that will be served in the community. Conditions will be attached to the sentence, and if those conditions are breached, you will lose your liberty.'' That would be consistent for non-custodial and custodial sentences.

David Cameron: I have sympathy with what was said by the hon. Members for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and for Nottingham, North. My new clause 10, which was not discussed, would have been honesty in sentencing writ large. It would have said that someone sentenced to one, two or three years in prison would have to serve that time—but with a little time off for good behaviour because prison governors need that incentive so that they can keep order. Although that is the ultimate in honesty in sentencing, it has the disadvantage that it takes no account of the importance of post-release supervision and probation.
 A case can be made for what the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey proposed, which is that when sentencing a prisoner, the judge should tell him, ''You will be sentenced to two years in prison. That means that you cannot be released until two years have passed, less a little time off for good behaviour. In addition, you will be sentenced to a certain time of probation and supervision.'' It should be made clear in court. I do not see why we cannot achieve that. 
 If there is one thing that undermines people's confidence in the criminal justice system, it is the feeling that time after time sentences are handed down but people are released halfway through them. It would be a huge breakthrough if the sentence read out 
 in court was accurate and took account of time off for good behaviour and the community sentence. 
 In response, the Government will advance two arguments, which I shall try to pre-empt. First, they will ask what would happen if judges gave sentences of two years, and two years meant two years, not one year. They will say that a huge cost would be incurred because people might be kept inside for longer, but I do not think that that would happen. Once we have honesty in sentencing, sentencers will think clearly and mean what they say.

Graham Allen: One role of the sentencing council could be to bring that issue to the party. It could make it clear to judges that the middle range of sentences is right and appropriate, and that they need not pitch sentences too high in the belief that the real sentence will end up in the middle range. The council could help us bring clarity to the issue.

David Cameron: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I have read the comments that my hon. Friend the Member for Woking made when the issue was debated at length in an earlier sitting. He said that sentencers were sometimes quite confused about whether four years meant two years or four years. If sentencers are confused, what about the general public and victims of crime?
 The second argument that will be gnawing away at the Government is that sentencers who react logically to the proposals and set sentences that are half as long will look weak, but I do not buy that argument either. The public will be much more convinced by real sentences. If judges sentence someone in open court to two years in prison plus two years probation, and two years in prison means two years—less a little time off for good behaviour—that will be an enormous breakthrough. 
 The hon. Members for Nottingham, North and for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and I are not asking the world—we are asking for a logical, sensible addition to custody plus. If the Minister could deliver that, it would be hugely worth while.

Hilary Benn: I agree entirely about the need to explain how the Bill's sentencing provisions will work. Understandably, the hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) took the opportunity to advance the arguments that he would have advanced had he been able to speak to his new clause, which dealt with a different sentencing framework. He and my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North spoke of the need for clarity, and we are at one on that. That is precisely why clause 157, which is headed
''Duty to give reasons for, and explain effect of, sentence''
 says that the court 
''must explain to the offender in ordinary language . . . the effect of the sentence''.
 In passing, I wonder whether the words ''ordinary language'' have ever appeared in statute before—that would be an interesting test to set ourselves. We agreed to include the phrase in statute for what I think is the first time precisely to address the argument made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North and others. With great persistence, application and 
 dedication, he argued that the courts should explain what they mean when they pass sentence. That said, the custodial period of the sentence may resume after release at the halfway point if someone fails to abide by the licence conditions that are placed on him. He will go back into custody and could serve the rest of the period in prison. 
 I am sure that it will not be beyond the wit of those involved to agree a recommended form of words to achieve the objective laid down in clause 157. Having set out the sentencing framework, we all agree that that it should be explained in such a way that everyone understands how it will work.

David Cameron: It is welcome that clause 157 refers to ''ordinary language'', but that ordinary language is not in the clause. The sentencer should say how much of the sentence will be served in prison and how much out of prison.

Hilary Benn: Let me look at the wording. The clause says that the court
''must explain to the offender in ordinary language . . . the effect of the sentence.''
 That is Ronseal wording and is very clear. The court must explain the impact that the sentence will have on him or her. In that way, victims, witnesses, others in court and people who subsequently read about the case will understand exactly what the sentence means. They will understand how much time the offender will spend in custody and on licence, which might be affected by whether he abides by the licence conditions and the impact of home detention curfew.

David Cameron: I hear what the Minister says, but does not clause 157 maintain the fiction of the current situation, that relief is given halfway through the sentence? That is what we should attack. One year should not mean six months, yet that impression will still obtain after the Bill has been passed. That is the missed opportunity that we have been talking about.

Hilary Benn: It is not a fiction: it is what the statute will provide, if we agree to clause 224, which says that the requisite custodial period means what is set out in subsection (3)(a). I entirely accept, however, that we want the public better to understand how a sentence is made up, because I reiterate that a sentence is not solely a custodial period.

Graham Allen: Will the Minister keep the wording under review, and if he feels that it is appropriate, suggest a form of words that makes him even happier than that which is currently in the Bill? The Bill is drafted by excellent, competent officials in the Department and parliamentary counsel. We bring to the party the eye of a constituency Member of Parliament. We know what will play in the constituencies and how best to explain what we are trying to do to our constituents. I ask him to keep an open mind on whether there might be a better form of words than that which he is defending.

Hilary Benn: I am happy to defend the wording, simply because it achieves the purpose. I am happy with it and hope that, in due course, my hon. Friend will come to share my sense of happiness.
 The proof of the effect of clause 157 will be the explanations given in court, as courts carry out the duty imposed on them by statute, and that issue will be dealt with in guidelines and training. I entirely accept the point that we must ensure that the clause works in such a way that people are given proper explanations of what sentences mean.

David Heath: The Minister will reinforce the words used in clause 157 if the provision is termed, in algebraic terms, not as a = b - c, but as a = b + c. That is the simple equation being put to him by hon. Members.

Hilary Benn: I rise, but I am unsure whether I have much more to say. I simply reiterate that the requirement to explain the sentence will work only if it is done in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests, namely that the sentence consists of a + b. With respect, it is a matter not of further tweaking the wording in clause 157, but of how the requirement to give an explanation of the sentence works in practice in the court, which is an issue for training and guidance.

Simon Hughes: I think that the Minister has got the message, but I think that something other than clause 157 may be needed. It describes the method of giving sentence. It sets out the way in which the judge should—and the words are happy in a sense—
''in ordinary language and in general terms''
 explain the reasons for the decision. We are asking for something that is more honest to the commentator—the local newspaper reporter—and the family of the victim. Instead of an approach that names the higher figure denoting the length of the sentence, and that may or may not get across the message that the state will have a duty to release the person some way through the sentence, we want things to be expressed the other way round. There should be honesty about the fact that the sentence is in two parts. 
 The difference would be not only a matter of presentation. The approach would be clear, and would therefore comply with the clause 157 rule, but it would also be consistent. I expect that some advisers on criminal justice policy, penal policy and criminology would say, ''No. It is important that the sentence should be set out together with the duty to release on licence.'' I know the argument, but we need to bite the bullet and say, ''We are changing that. The sentence has two parts: the first part inside and the second outside.'' That would not be a sentence with an option to disappear out of the gates—it would be a two-part sentence. 
 I accept that, if we could achieve that, the formula might, as the Minister says, not be a matter to be set out in the Bill. However, I think that we would all be satisfied if we could agree on the formula before the Bill is enacted. It is unnecessary for the relevant part of the formula not to be standardised by then. That would not preclude the judge from explaining the implications of sentencing in a particular case, and it would not preclude him or her from explaining, in 
 ordinary language and general terms, ''I have decided on this sentence because the crime that has been committed is a terrible one, of a sort that has been happening in this village for three years—everyone is doing it.'' Those are different issues. If we agreed on the core formula by the time the Bill was enacted, that would add great clarity, which has not so far been present.

David Cameron: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. If we can get the wording that is to be read out in court right, our constituents will be much happier about the sentencing process.
 I may be missing something, but I cannot see in clause 157 or elsewhere any requirement for the court to explain—as I think it should—the fact that some people may be released even before the halfway point in their sentence, under the home detention curfew or under provisions for even earlier release. That has caused much disquiet. Often people who are sentenced to a year in prison do not even serve six months, but just a few weeks, because they are sent home on curfew. The provision that the sentencer must explain 
''the effect of the sentence''
 is very vague. Elsewhere in the Bill there is great detail. Am I right in thinking that there is no provision anywhere requiring the court to explain that a person might be released even earlier than halfway through the sentence?

Hilary Benn: I do not agree that that clause is vague in requiring the sentencer to
''explain . . . in ordinary language . . . the effect of the sentence''.
 That is crystal clear. However, hon. Members and I are at one in our objective. I undertake happily to reflect on the suggestion that it would be helpful at some point to see sample forms of words that might be used. Clause 157 provides the means to achieve our shared objective and requires the court to explain the effect of the sentence in ordinary language. I can understand the anxiety of hon. Members of all parties to see what that might mean in practice. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 224 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 225 - Power to release prisoners on licence

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 554, in
clause 225, page 124, line 33, leave out 'and' and insert 'to'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 710, 556, 557, 559 to 563, and 567.

Hilary Benn: The amendments, with the exception of No. 567, amend the provisions for home detention curfew to accommodate intermittent custody. As currently drafted, the clause does not reflect the fact that during intermittent custody the defendant does not serve the custodial and licence periods in continuous, single blocks of time. Given that offenders serving intermittent custody will have been assessed as suitable for the sentence, which involves regular periods on licence in the community, it is likely
 that they will also be suitable for release on home detention curfew, so the provisions for home detention curfew must be amended to apply to intermittent custody.
 Amendments Nos. 554, 710, 556, 557 and 559 rephrase terms representing portions of an offender's sentence into numbers of custodial days left to be served. Amendments Nos. 560 and 561 ensure that the power to amend those portions by order refers to the new intermittent custody provisions. Amendment No. 562 omits a reference to subsection (3)(i), because it has been moved to subsection (4)(b) by amendment No. 560. Amendment No. 563 adds new definitions for terms used in calculating home detention curfew for intermittent custody. 
 Amendment No. 567 relates to the curfew conditions of home detention curfew licences. In the case of other prison sentences in which home detention curfew is granted, the curfew condition remains in place until the date the offender would have been released if he or she had not received home detention curfew. The wording is not appropriate for intermittent custody, with its intermittent licence periods. In that sentence, an offender will be subject to home detention curfew for the number of days equal to the number of custodial days that he or she would have had left to serve if they had not been released on home detention curfew. 
 As an example, to explain to hon. Members, who, I am sure, are following carefully, take an offender who has been given 60 days of custody within a 40-week sentence of intermittent custody to be served at weekends. If he is given home detention curfew, he will serve three quarters of that—45 days—in custody, which leaves 15 days. When he is released on his 45th day he will serve 15 days on home detention curfew. Following that, he remains on intermittent custody licence for the remainder of the 40 weeks. The intention is that the offender serves his home detention curfew in a single block following his release on the final day of custody, which is a much more sensible way of trying to accommodate home detention curfew and intermittent custody than trying to weave the home detention portions in between the periods of intermittent custody. 
 In other words, the home detention is saved up and put on the end, so that things are much clearer. One of the great advantages of that is that one would not have to put tags on and off during the sentence. There would be one period during which someone on intermittent custody would serve on the tag. That would be at the end, after the days had been added up, as in the example that I gave. I hope that that is clear.

David Heath: The Minister could not have been clearer in his exposition. Consolidation of sentences is sensible and we all applaud it.
 Has the Home Office done any research into the application of home detention curfews? We know that in general they work well—I think that the successful completion rate is about 90 per cent., which is good news. However, there is at least some evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, that there is an inconsistency among different institutions in their readiness to use 
 home detention curfew, and that prisoners' chances of securing a release via that mechanism vary considerably depending on whether they are in local prisons, which seem to use the scheme far less than other institutions. I am sure that the Minister would agree that at least broad consistency would be of benefit. Why do different institutions have different attitudes?

Simon Hughes: Following my hon. Friend's point, I wish to ask for two more bits of information. First, is there any developmental evidence of the success of the home detention curfew? Do we have year-by-year percentage comparisons of curfew periods that show whether there was reoffending? Secondly, are percentage figures available for prisoners who did not reoffend during the two years afterwards?
 It might be helpful if the Minister set out, as this has been occasionally controversial, the normal procedure for home detention curfews. My understanding is that there are two control mechanisms: an electronic one and the rules that set out where and when a released prisoner must be. Those are interrelated, and we need to understand current practices. If somebody is released on a home detention curfew, what checks and balances are there to ensure that if they break the rules they will be picked up? How well does the technology work? There has been a battle to establish confidence in the system. It is a sensible system, as it allows for rehabilitation in the community. It is a good and worthwhile initiative. 
 My hon. Friend spoke about local prisons. The prison establishment, for obvious reasons, is spread throughout the country, and that means, for example, that a significant number of prisoners from the south-east of England are imprisoned many miles from home. The provision of places, however, is spread more evenly. What plans does the prisons estate have to reorganise—and it has been done several times before—the provision so that we can maximise the number of prisoners from London and the south-east who go to prison, particularly for less serious offences, in London and the south-east? That would greatly reduce the concerns of prisoners and their families. 
 A similar concern is felt in Wales. There are not enough prison places for prisoners there, and many Welsh prisoners are sent to English prisons. When I was at prisons in Swansea and Cardiff, I was struck that there may be spare capacity. I am aware, however, that Swansea prison has experienced rebuilding problems. There are some very good specialised prisons in Wales such as the one at Usk in Monmouthshire. Is there a likelihood that prisoners from London and from Wales will be imprisoned nearer home?

Hilary Benn: A research study on the first 16 months of the curfew scheme commissioned by the Home Office was published in June 2001. It showed that home detention curfew assists prisoners in their transition back into the community. The home detention curfew scheme came into operation in January 1999; since then, more than 64,000 offenders have participated in the scheme. There are about 3,000 prisoners on curfew at any one time. About 90 per cent. of prisoners complete home detention
 curfew successfully, and less than 3 per cent. are reported to reoffend. The remaining recalls are due either to breaches of the curfew conditions or to an inability to monitor electronically—for example, if accommodation is lost—because in order to work the system needs suitable accommodation, with a telephone to which the monitoring device can be attached.
 In practice, the curfew period usually lasts from 7 pm to 7 am, and the offender is electronically monitored by means of a tagging device linked to the telephone. I think that I am right in saying that the tagging device sends out a signal, and if that signal is not received by the monitoring device because the person has gone away from the home—in other words, the person has not complied with the curfew conditions—that is identified by the monitoring company. Inquiries will clearly be made as to the reason. It might be a legitimate reason—for instance, someone has suddenly been taken ill and had to go to hospital—but the person may have decided not to comply with the curfew conditions, in which case the HDC will be brought to an end. 
 As I have said, there are clear trigger points at which the contractors are required to send breach reports to the Prison Service. All breach reports are considered and, when appropriate, acted on within 24 hours. We carefully monitor the contractors to ensure that they are issuing breach reports at the appropriate time. 
 The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey raised a broader issue about prison places. I acknowledge that he and all hon. Members will be aware of the problem, particularly given the current population pressures on the Prison Service, and the difficulties that inherently result from trying to keep prisoners close to their families—something that the Prison Service works hard to achieve. When taking decisions about the provision of additional prison capacity, the Prison Service pays close regard to the point that he raised. For example there are two new prisons: one at Peterborough and one at Ashford—that is not Ashford in Kent, but the Ashford to the west of London.

Simon Hughes: Middlesex.

Hilary Benn: Yes. It is intended in part to meet the particular concern expressed by the hon. Gentleman. I am aware also of the concerns that he raised about Wales. We are aware of the difficulties. The Prison Service does its best, but it has to juggle a number of considerations. The first is the desire for prisoners to be close to their homes. The second is whether the prison is appropriate to the prisoner's category. The third is whether, within that category of prison, there is space to undertake courses that are a necessary part of their rehabilitation. At all times, those three factors are being juggled by the Prison Service as it tries to accommodate its strongest objective, which is to ensure that people can be close to home whenever possible.

David Heath: Are presumptions made in favour of home detention curfew releases? It struck me, as my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey was speaking, that one deficiency is the lack of mother and baby units in secure detention—and those that we have are effectively in the wrong place to provide a service for large swathes of the country. An offending mother with a baby is a good example of a class of offender who could, as a priority, properly be released under the scheme instead of being sent to mother and baby units a long way from their other children and the rest of the family.

Hilary Benn: All those who are eligible for HDC will be considered. The hon. Gentleman will be aware of the exclusions, but someone who fits the circumstances that he described who is eligible for HDC would clearly be considered, subject to meeting the requirements of the scheme—for instance, that there is accommodation to which they can be released. One of the reasons why people who would otherwise be eligible for getting HDC are not released is that they have nowhere to go where the monitoring device can be attached. Otherwise, subject to satisfactory accommodation being available and to meeting the other requirements of the scheme, there is no reason why people should not be able to participate in it.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 710, in 
clause 225, page 124, line 33, leave out from 'may' to end of line 36 and insert— 
 '(a) release on licence under this section a fixed term prisoner aged 18 or over, other than a prisoner serving a sentence of intermittent custody, at any time during the period of 90 days ending with the day on which the prisoner will have served the requisite custodial period, and 
 (b) release on licence under this section a prisoner serving a sentence of intermittent custody when 90 or less of the required custodial days remain to be served.'
 No. 556, in 
clause 225, page 124, line 37, leave out '(1)' and insert '(1)(a)'.
 No. 557, in 
clause 225, page 124, line 41, at end insert— 
 '(2A) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply in relation to a prisoner unless— 
 (a) the number of required custodial days is at least 56, and 
 (b) the prisoner has served— 
 (i) at least 42 of those days, and 
 (ii) at least three-quarters of the total number of those days.'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 558, in
clause 225, page 125, line 16, leave out from beginning to 'or' in line 17.
 Subsection (3) lists those offenders not eligible for home detention curfew. Subsection (3)(h) relates to the prisoner's return to prison at any time under section 116 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which provides that if an offender who has been released from prison commits another imprisonable offence before his sentence has expired, the court may order his return to prison to serve a period of imprisonment not exceeding the length of the period between the date of the new offence and the expiry date of the sentence. Section 116 applies to all 
 sentenced prisoners from the date of their release to the expiry date of the sentence, whether they are released on licence or not. The Bill repeals section 116, as offenders will remain on licence until the end point of their sentence: that is, there is no unexpired part of the sentence beyond the licence period. Clauses 232 and 233 provide for the recall of prisoners while on licence. 
 The amendment removes that category of prisoner from the list of exclusions for home detention curfew. Statutorily excluding from home detention curfew prisoners who have previously breached conditions while on licence unnecessarily limits the discretion of governors when considering such prisoners for release on HDC in future sentences. However, governors will, of course, continue to take such breaches into account when assessing whether an offender is suitable for release on HDC in future. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 559, in 
clause 225, page 125, line 21, at end insert 
 'or, where the sentence is one of intermittent custody, the number of the required custodial days remaining to be served is less than 14'.
 No. 560, in 
clause 225, page 125, line 25, leave out '(1)' and insert 
 '(1)(a) or (b), (2A) or (3)(i)'.
 No. 561, in 
clause 225, page 125, line 28, at end insert 'or (2A)(b)(ii)'.
 No. 562, in 
clause 225, page 125, leave out lines 29 to 31.
 No. 563, in 
clause 225, page 125, leave out lines 32 and 33 and insert— 
 '(5) In this section— 
 ''the required custodial days'', in relation to a person serving a sentence of intermittent custody, means— 
 (a) the number of custodial days specified under section 165, or 
 (b) in the case of two or more sentences of intermittent custody, the aggregate of the numbers so specified; 
 ''the requisite custodial period'', in relation to a person serving any sentence other than a sentence of intermittent custody, has the meaning given by paragraph (a), (b) or (d) of section 224(3); 
 ''sentence of intermittent custody'' means a sentence to which an intermittent custody order relates.'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 225, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 226 - Release on licence of prisoner serving

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 564, in
clause 226, page 125, line 38, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert— 
 '(2) As soon as— 
 (a) a prisoner to whom this section applies has served one-half of the appropriate custodial term, and 
 (b) the Parole Board has directed his release under this section, 
 it is the duty of the Secretary of State to release him on licence. 
 (2A) The Parole Board may not give a direction under subsection (2) unless the Board is satisfied that it is no longer 
necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. 
 (3) As soon as a prisoner to whom this section applies has served the appropriate custodial term, it is the duty of the Secretary of State to release him on licence unless the prisoner has previously been recalled under section 232.'.
 The amendment arises following the judgments in the cases of Stafford and of Benjamin and Wilson. It is necessary because it requires the Secretary of State to release an offender serving an extended sentence, once directed to do so by the Parole Board. The detention of an offender past the halfway point of sentence is purely on the basis of risk. The offender is entitled to have that risk determined by an independent body. Once that determination has been made, there can, following recent case law, be no justification—this partly answers the point raised by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome—for any further decision-making function on the part of the Secretary of State. The clause must therefore be amended to take account of such judgments. 
 The amendment also brings provision for the extended sentence into line with release provisions for the sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection and life sentences contained in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 226, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 227 - Power to release prisoners on

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: In what circumstances would the Secretary of State consider it so urgent to release a prisoner under licence that he would be unable to consult the Parole Board? I find it difficult to conceive of such circumstances. Changes could be made to the prison regime on extreme compassionate grounds, but actual release, without consideration by the Parole Board, seems unlikely. The Minister obviously has something in mind. Will he share it with the Committee?

Hilary Benn: Yes. The circumstances would be those in which death was imminent. A request would be received for compassionate release because someone was terminally ill, but it may not always be possible to carry out the consultation for which the clause would otherwise provide. Subsection (2) covers that particular, albeit rare, eventuality.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 227 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 228 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 229 - Licence conditions

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 565, in
clause 229, page 127, line 3, at end insert— 
 '(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(i), any reference in the relevant court order to the licence period specified in the order is, in relation to a prohibited activity requirement, exclusion requirement, residence requirement or supervision requirement, to be taken to include a reference to any other period during which the prisoner is released on licence under section 225 or 227.'.
 Under the amendment, prisoners serving a sentence of custody plus or intermittent custody who are released early on home detention curfew or on compassionate grounds may be subject to certain licence requirements despite their court-ordered licence period not having started. It also allows a prohibited activity requirement, exclusion requirement, residence requirement or supervision requirement to be added to that period. The net effect is to ensure that licence conditions kick in when the prisoner is no longer in custody. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 566, in
clause 229, page 127, line 5, leave out 
 '(including such a sentence imposed under section 207) or more'
 and insert 
'or more (including such a sentence imposed under section 207)'.
 The amendment is necessary to rectify a simple drafting error, because a word has been misplaced in the clause. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 229, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 230 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 231 - Curfew condition to be included in licence under section 225

Amendment made: No. 567, in 
clause 231, page 128, line 9, at end insert— 
 '(3A) Subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a released person to whom an intermittent custody order relates; and in relation to such a person the curfew condition is to remain in force until the number of days during which it has been in force is equal to the number of the required custodial days, as defined in section 225(5), that remained to be served at the time when he was released under section 225.'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 231, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 232 to 234 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 235 - Additional days for disciplinary offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: We are making good progress. The clause raises an important matter that has been the subject of recent court judgments. I seek clarification from the Minister on his understanding of the European Court's judgment and on whether he thinks that this proposal is compatible. My understanding is that the clause will allow prison
 rules to include provision for the award of additional days of imprisonment to those serving a fixed-term sentence or to prisoners on remand who have committed disciplinary offences.
 The European Court's argument was that the courts should pass sentence, not prison governors, because deprivation of liberty was a matter for the civil courts and should not be regarded as an administrative sanction for prison governors to impose. It would be sensible for me to ask the Minister to state what the court decided in 2001 and how the Government believe that clause 235 would be compatible with its decision.

Humfrey Malins: I shall briefly make a point that the General Council of the Bar has raised. It fears, in relation to another clause, that the removal of remission may lead to a decline in prison discipline at a time when the service is already at breaking point. The Bar Council says that similar criticism is relevant to clause 235. It points out what I think we know to be the truth: young offender institutions have been the subject of a great deal of criticism over the years, and the suicide and self-harm rate in some of those institutions is a matter of concern. Every time that we face the issue of additional days for disciplinary offences, we also face the prospect—I put it no higher—of discipline and morale problems. That is why I referred to young offenders. I simply want to float that point. I say to the Minister that the clause—probably correctly—causes some people concern.

Hilary Benn: The clause re-enacts the Criminal Justice Act 1991, which enables rules to be made under the Prison Act 1952 for additional days to be added to a prisoner's sentence should he be found guilty of a disciplinary offence. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey referred to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights on 15 July 2002—not 2001—that disciplinary proceedings that led to awards of additional days were a breach of article 6. They breached the provisions that relate to a fair trial because it was prison governors who took the decisions. The European Court therefore ruled that that was not allowed.
 For that reason, on 15 August, Parliament amended the prison rules to allow the Secretary of State to appoint independent adjudicators. It is perfectly in order, in re-enacting the provision in the 1991 Act, for additional days to be awarded in serious cases. However, an independent adjudicator must award those additional days, not a prison governor. Prisoners have the right to be legally represented at public expense in those proceedings. 
 These two changes have been made to the system to permit added days to continue to be awarded in certain cases. I must confess that there was some concern in the Prison Service at the time of the judgment about the impact that the changes would have. However, that concern has not been borne out by subsequent events. Although independent adjudicators only can award added days, prison governors still retain several administrative measures such as withdrawal of privileges and the removal of television. A number of sanctions are available in a prison to assist prison governors in maintaining good 
 discipline and to encourage offenders to behave themselves when they are in prison. 
 It is interesting to note that added days were done away with in Scotland quite a long time ago. The anxiety that the hon. Members for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and for Woking referred to, which people felt at the time of the judgment, has not been borne out by subsequent events. The Prison Service now feels that the most appropriate route is to have the independent adjudicators who deal with the most serious cases, because of the penalty that can be provided. I refer to the more serious cases, because not all the cases that would have been considered for added days under the old arrangements now come forward to the independent adjudicators. At the same time, prison governors are encouraged to use the range of administrative measures and sanctions at their disposal to deal with other infractions of prison rules. In fairness, one could say that the system is working well and that the fears originally expressed have not come to pass.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful to the Minister and have two questions. First, am I right in assuming that there has been no further challenge to the corrected policy that adjudicators can have the quasi-judicial function, and that they are therefore outside the administrative provision? Maybe the Minister remembers—I do not—whether the court in its original ruling said that. It would be sufficient if the matter was one for non-administrative, independent decision making and, if so, that was trailed by the judgment.
 Secondly, is the court understood to have held that a maximum period is permitted for extra penalty? My assumption is that it would not be possible in any event to put any more remission back on than the person in question had earned by good behaviour. He or she could only forfeit their good behaviour bonus. It would be helpful if the Minister has information to answer that question. If he cannot answer now, perhaps he can later. It is a matter of principle that even if someone misbehaves, he or she should not be in a worse position at the end of their time in prison than they would have been, in light of the judgment of the court in the first place.

Hilary Benn: I shall gladly respond to the hon. Gentleman's second point in writing. In relation to his first point, the new system was designed to comply with the European convention on human rights. I am happy to confirm that there have been no challenges to the new arrangements since they were put in place.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 235 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 236 - Persons liable to removal from

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 906, in
clause 236, page 130, line 12, leave out from 'effect' to end of line 13.
 I have been reflecting on the wording of the amendment, and I am not sure whether it achieves my intentions, so I say right from the start that I do 
 not intend to press it to a Division. However, I wish to use it to explore an important issue. 
 The clause enables persons to whom the extended sentence detailed by clause 236 applies to be removed from the United Kingdom at the appropriate break point in their sentence without reference to the Parole Board. The argument given in the explanatory notes is that if a person is being sent abroad, they are out of sight and out of mind, and the Parole Board is therefore not relevant to that procedure. However, it is important to remember that clause 236 applies to clauses 207 and 208, which cover those offenders who have been convicted of violent or sexual offences and are considered to be a significant risk to members of the public, through the occasioning of serious harm in the future. 
 If the Government plan to release people who are likely to commit further serious offences of a violent or sexual nature, it, it does not matter ha'pence whether they are released in this country or into another community to commit those offences. It is an irresponsible act. Surely we in the United Kingdom have some responsibility to the public in other countries. 
 If a person is likely to remain a serious threat to public safety, irrespective of whether the Secretary of State makes the decision without the benefit of the advice of the Parole Board, that person should be released only if that means translation to imprisonment or appropriate custody or other sentence in another jurisdiction. Anything else is simply washing our hands of the results of our action. That is not the behaviour of a responsible Government or judicial system. 
 In what circumstances would the power be used? Would not it be more sensible for the Parole Board still to be consulted? If the board maintained the view that the individual represented a serious threat to the public, would not it be more appropriate for that person neither to be released in this country nor deported to be free to commit further offences in another country? The provision seems irresponsible, and I cannot support it. I should need a great deal of justification from the Minister to show in what circumstances it would be appropriate to send serious offenders elsewhere to do their mischief.

Hilary Benn: A prisoner who is liable for removal from the United Kingdom—that is what we are talking about: people who can be deported—and who is serving an extended sentence can be deported after serving half the sentence. Under the clause, release followed by deportation would occur automatically halfway through the sentence. Clearly, offenders who are not being deported are, as the hon. Gentleman has recognised, subject to the Parole Board's decision about their release. The amendment would make the release of offenders due for deportation also a matter for the Parole Board.
 It might be helpful to mention that the clause is a re-enactment of section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Only a few offenders would be covered by the provision, which has been in force for getting on for 12 years. The difficulty with the amendment is that the 
 Parole Board would consider matters such as licence conditions and supervision following release, which are irrelevant to someone who is to be deported. There would be no means of enforcing those licence conditions or ensuring supervision. It is simpler and more practical to deport such offenders at the earliest opportunity. 
 I understand the hon. Gentleman's argument, but it would be for the jurisdictions that were to receive individuals who had been convicted in the way set out in the Bill—or, indeed, people convicted of very serious offences under the current provisions, who reached the end of a fixed sentence and were then deported and returned to their country of origin—to determine how to safeguard themselves and their people. However, given that the clause is a re-enactment, I undertake to find out more about the extent to which the existing statute has been used, and about what is done, in the few relevant cases, to inform the other jurisdiction that the person in question is coming its way.

David Heath: With respect, that does not answer the point. Informing the other jurisdiction is of no benefit because, unless its legal system is oddly framed, it would be unable to take into account the offence committed by the individual while he was in the United Kingdom, where the offence is, effectively, a spent offence, because the term of imprisonment has ended. I cannot envisage circumstances in which that person could then be taken into custody for that offence. So we have a situation in which, if the person had remained in this country, he might have been assessed by the Parole Board as continuing to pose a risk to the community, but the moment he goes outside British jurisdiction, he is entirely at liberty, irrespective of whether that advice is given to another jurisdiction.
 I said that I was not entirely satisfied with the purport of the amendment because it still allows the Secretary of State to make a decision, irrespective of the Parole Board's decision to deport in those circumstances. I add that proviso about the strict interpretation of the amendment. What would happen if the polarity of the situation were to be reversed? The situation does not apply in European Union jurisdictions, but let us suppose that it does. Can one imagine what the tabloid newspapers would make of it if the French Government were to send us people who had been convicted of serious violent or sexual offences who, in the view of the competent authorities, remained a danger to the public at large, who had served only half of the sentence imposed by the court in that jurisdiction, and who were then deported to our shores and were at liberty to commit offences in our jurisdiction? My suspicion is that the editor of The Sun would have something to say about that, and I believe that any responsible person would. 
 Whether it is a re-enactment or not, it opens up some serious questions about the policy objectives of allowing people to be deported in such circumstances, other than to go directly into custody in another 
 jurisdiction, which is entirely different. I shall reflect on what the Minister has said, but he has not really dealt with the case that I put to him. I should be interested to receive any information that he can give me on the number of occasions on which the provision has been used in the past and in what circumstances. The matter is a cause for grave concern and undermines co-operation between jurisdictions and police authorities. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 568, in 
clause 236, page 130, line 14, leave out 'Part' and insert 'Chapter'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 236, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 237 and 238 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 239 - Release on licence etc:

Amendments made: No. 569, in 
clause 239, page 132, line 22, leave out '16' and insert '17'.
 No. 570, in 
clause 239, page 132, line 27, leave out '16' and insert '17'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 239, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 240 - Alteration by order of relevant

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: I seek clarification from the Minister about the implications of this wide-ranging clause. It gives the Secretary of State power to amend by order the proportion of a custodial sentence of 12 months or more that must be served in prison before release. It also enables the Secretary of State to amend by order an extended sentence given for serious sexual or violent offences under clauses 207 and 208. Such sentences must be served before a prisoner is eligible for release on the recommendation of the Parole Board.
 The clause does not qualify the power of the Secretary of State; he could, in theory, tell Parliament that rather than 50 per cent. of the original sentence being spent inside, 60 per cent., 75 per cent. or 99 per cent. will be spent inside. He could also say that the entirety of the extended sentence could be spent inside. I am uncomfortable with the clause, as it undermines the principle of legislation that the Government introduced on the basis of the Halliday report and other consultation. 
 It introduces custody plus and custody minus, and it introduces a regime under which people can be given a twin-part sentence. Usually, it is 12 months or under or 51 weeks or under. Some of us would like three months of the sentence to be spent inside and the rest outside. If a sentence is longer than 12 months it 
 should be split, and if it is an extended sentence there is an add-on for risk. We ought not to include a clause that could allow these provisions to be ripped up and rewritten by order—even one that required parliamentary approval. If we accept the principle that it is important to get sentencing guidelines and the balance between custody and licence right, we need primary and not secondary legislation. I would need a great deal of persuading that the clause should stay in the Bill.

Hilary Benn: This is simply a re-enactment of the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, subject to affirmative resolution. That may help the hon. Gentleman. The clause also enables the Secretary of State to amend by order the proportion of an extended sentence for certain sexual and violent offences, and that relates to clauses 207 and 208, which must be served before a prisoner is eligible for release on the recommendation of the Parole Board.
 I understand the hon. Gentleman's concern about the procedure that clause 240 provides for, but I can only reaffirm that it carries forward what is already in the 1991 Act.

Simon Hughes: I am aware of existing legislation. Is there absolutely no limitation on the Secretary of State's power? The clause will allow him to introduce draft orders removing all the licence provisions and also orders for non-custodial elements for general or extended sentences. There is no limitation on his powers; he could remove the provisions of custody plus and custody minus completely if he wished. Perhaps the clause remains in the Bill because the word-processor reprinted it without people having thought through its implications in the light of custody plus and custody minus.
 Custody plus and custody minus are based on the principle that a sentence will be in halves. The clause is a legacy of the old regime; I wonder whether it is not a leftover. Perhaps there was a mini discussion among civil servants or Ministers, who said, ''Oh, look; it is not really consistent, but shall we leave it in?'' I guess that they said that it would be good to give the Secretary of State the opportunity to have lots of power, so they left it in. That is not a good enough reason for keeping it. Will the Minister confirm that it is unqualified, and explain how it is consistent with the new regime?

Hilary Benn: It does not relate to custody plus or to intermittent custody. I understand the hon. Gentleman's argument, but the Government are understandably wedded to these new structures, as they form an important part of the Bill's sentencing provisions. However, I am happy to confirm that this power—as I say, it is a re-enactment—could alter the relevant proportion of sentences of 12-months plus, or of extended sentences, if that were the wish of the Secretary of State; and it would be subject to the affirmative resolution, so a case would have to made to the House of Commons and voted upon.
 Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 15, Noes 2.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 240 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 241 and 242 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 16 - Deferment of service

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 727, in
schedule 16, page 227, line 20, at end insert 'in custody'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 728, in 
schedule 16, page 228, line 8, leave out from 'with' to 'relating' and insert 'a written report'.
 No. 729, in 
schedule 16, page 228, line 39, after 'offence', insert 'punishable with imprisonment'.
 No. 730, in 
schedule 16, page 229, line 38, leave out paragraph (b).

Humfrey Malins: I shall be brief. Deferment of sentence is introduced in clause 242. On a personal note, I must tell the Minister that deferring sentence is not helpful. Most judges of any experience do not defer sentence because it is more trouble than it is worth—and here's why.
 Judges normally defer sentence by saying to the defendant, ''I defer sentence for six months, and during that time you must first behave yourself and not commit any other offences; secondly, you must get a job; and, thirdly, you must make some reparation.'' The list may include other things. The odds are that the defendant will come back to court at the end of the period of deferment and be only halfway there—but not quite: he had a job but lost it; or he kept out of trouble but was given a caution. It puts the courts in a difficult position, and most experienced judges never defer sentence. However, the amendments are simple. 
 New section 1(6) of the Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, proposed in schedule 16 provides that a court that 
''defers passing sentence on an offender shall not on the same occasion remand him.''
 I assume that that means remanded in custody, which is the reason for amendment No. 727. I would be happy if the Minister could confirm that. New section 1A of the 2000 Act includes the phrase 
''such information as the court may require''.
 That envisages an oral report, but it would be tidier to use the words ''a written report'', as suggested in amendment No. 728. 
 Amendment No. 729 seeks to amend proposed new section 1C(1), which states: 
''A court which under section 1 above has deferred passing sentence on an offender may deal with him before the end of the period of deferment if during that period he is convicted in Great Britain of any offence''.
 I assume that that must mean an offence that carries a custodial sentence, although it is not stated, because otherwise it could apply to a road traffic offence, which is of no relevance to the provision. 
 I move on to amendment No. 730. I will not press any of my amendments, but page 229 made me think that if sentenced is passed by the Crown court it must mean that another offence had been committed. Would this provision aggravate an offence that had previously been the subject of deferred sentence by the magistrates? However, that is not a strong point. If I were asked as to my best point in the past five minutes I would be pushed to tell the Minister what it was, but I think it was the point that the offender should not be remanded for an offence carrying a custodial sentence.

Hilary Benn: I listened with interest to the hon. Gentleman's comments about deferment of sentence. Some judges seek to defer sentences and some do not. I respect enormously the hon. Gentleman's experience. As he said, sentences are deferred to enable the court to monitor the offender's compliance with community requirements. The offender will have a supervisor who will provide the court with information as to compliance. As with suspended sentences, if the offender does not comply or commits a new offence, he can be dealt with immediately.
 In relation to amendment No. 727, the Bill currently states, ''remand him''. It is not necessary to add ''in custody'', because at this stage of the proceedings after conviction remand could only mean in custody. That is the confirmation that the hon. Gentleman was seeking. 
 Amendment No. 728 would limit the provision of information to a written report. We made provision for reports to be provided in oral form for pre-sentence reports under an earlier clause and we would like to retain that flexibility and read it through to these provisions. 
 Amendment No. 730 would remove the power of the magistrates court to commit an offender to the Crown court for sentence. We are dealing with a re-enactment of section 1(5)(b) of the Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. There is no reason why, in cases where an offender has pleaded guilty before venue, the court cannot commit the offender to sentence after a deferment as well as straight away. There is no conflict with the changes to committal for sentence in the earlier parts of the Bill. The section 3 referred to in proposed new section 1D(2)(b) is section 3 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which the Bill amends. 
 In relation to amendment No. 729, proposed new section 1C(1) is a discretionary power, but it should go by the court, which can then choose to ignore a road traffic offence if necessary—to use the hon. Gentleman's example. However, we would want serious non-custodial offences to be included.

Humfrey Malins: What about non-imprisonable offences?

Hilary Benn: I shall reflect on that point.

Humfrey Malins: The Minister has kindly undertaken to reflect on the point; I think that he thinks that it is not a bad one. Given that he is going to come up with a serious non-imprisonable offence, I will look forward to his written response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Schedule 16 agreed to. 
 Clause 243 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 17 - Inclusion of drug treatment

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 915, in
schedule 17, page 230, line 41, at end insert, 
 'and 
 (c) that his dependency upon, or propensity to misuse, drugs is related to his offending behaviour, such that it is relevant and proportionate for the court to require treatment, and 
 (d) that the option of voluntary treatment provided concurrent to the order would be unsatisfactory'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 916, in
schedule 17, page 232, line 11, at end insert, 
 'and 
 (c) that his dependency upon, or propensity to misuse, drugs is related to his offending behaviour, such that it is relevant and proportionate for the court to require treatment, and 
 (d) that the option of voluntary treatment provided concurrent to the order would be unsatisfactory'.

Simon Hughes: The schedule is linked to clause 243. It would give the courts power to include drug treatment and testing in certain orders in respect of young offenders. It raises an issue that we have touched upon before, which is when is it appropriate for young people, particularly 14 to 17-year-olds and, in theory, those who are even younger, to be subject to a formal drug treatment and testing order? The children's organisations and societies quite reasonably express concern about this.
 The amendment would allow the power to be used only if alternatives of voluntary treatment had been considered and rejected for good reason. At present, the power is proposed to be available where a court proposing to make an action plan is satisfied that the offender is dependent on or has a propensity to misuse of drugs, and that his dependency or propensity is such as to require and be susceptible to treatment. If the amendment were agreed to, the dependency on or propensity to misuse of drugs would be related to the 
 offending behaviour. We must ensure that we do not send youngsters for compulsory drug treatment and testing if their offence is unrelated to drug addiction. There may be perfectly good reasons for treating their drug addiction but making them subject to a court order, if is unrelated to the offence, may not be helpful at all. 
 Any such order should be relevant and proportionate to the offence. If the offence was breaking a window, nicking some apples off a tree or some sweets from a sweetshop, it might not be proportionate to send the offender through a great regime of drug treatment and testing. Secondly such an order could come into play only if the option of voluntary treatment provided concurrently to the order would be unsatisfactory. If it were known through the social inquiry report that the youngster had had contact with solvents and might have a solvent abuse concern, there might well be an argument for dealing with it. However, voluntary regimes might be able to do that. 
 Youngsters of 14 to 17 often breach orders to which they are made subject. That is not necessarily intentional; it could be natural adolescent indiscipline. They might not turn up. They might be persuaded to go off with their mates instead of turning up at the health centre, the doctor's surgery, the clinic, the school education welfare office or the local family centre. That would bring down on their heads all the sanctions that result from breaching an order. 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Simon Hughes: The Children's Society has provided a strong argument in support of writing the qualifications into the schedule, and I think that the Committee should heed it. It states:
''The Children's Society believes that any compulsory medical or psychological treatment by court order should be taken as a very serious prospect, and recognised as one that incurs many civil and children's rights issues. We are concerned in principle at the prospect of children being compelled, on pain of the criminal offence of breaching a court order, to undergo the treatment they need. We recognise, however, that these are measures to which the Government and many others have a strong commitment . . . We are therefore deeply concerned that the provisions contained in Schedule 17 do not include safeguards to ensure that the very serious step of using court compulsion to treatment would only be used where absolutely necessary, and where voluntary options had already been considered and tried.
We are also concerned that, for a court to compel drug treatment as part of a sentence there ought to be good reason for that treatment to form part of the disposal for their offence. The inclusion of treatment in the order should not merely be justified simply because the child needs it and would benefit from it. For example, a child suffering badly from asthma may both need and benefit from regular medical attention during the course of their sentence, however it would not be considered something appropriate to require within their sentence, on pain of breach for failure to comply. For this reason, we believe that the link between the individual child's drug use and the offence(s) for which they have been convicted, should be demonstrated to the court in order to warrant the inclusion of treatment requirements.''
 That is a strong argument. There should be a clear link between the drug problem or addiction, if there is 
 one, and the offence. There should be a clear view that there is no alternative way to deal with the matter. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic.

Hilary Benn: If a young offender has a dependency on or a propensity to misuse drugs, it is important for the courts to have the option to include a treatment requirement in an action plan order or supervision order, regardless of whether that dependency or propensity is specifically related to the offence.
 We are all aware of the evidence, which we have debated at length, of the link between illegal drug use and offending. Although not all drug users go on to commit crimes related to their drug use, it is important to take every opportunity—particularly in the age group in question—to identify and deal with, as early as possible, dependency on and propensity to misuse drugs. The point is to do it early, to minimise the chance that the young person will become a persistent drug user with a life of persistent crime. 
 I think that the answer to the hon. Gentleman's point is that the court would include a treatment requirement in the orders if it was satisfied that that would be a relevant and proportionate intervention. That test is very important. As to voluntary drug treatment running concurrently with an order, it is open to any misuser of drugs—anyone with a problem—to seek voluntary treatment at any time. If the offender has done so and the courts are made aware of it, they can take it into account in considering whether it is appropriate to include a treatment requirement in an order. 
 The purpose of the schedule is to allow treatment to be included as a component of a community sentence. If an offender consents to treatment as part of an order but subsequently drops out or withdraws his or her consent, that would be taken into account in deciding how best to deal with them in the light of the continuing aim to help tackle drug-using behaviour. If the treatment were solely voluntary, the offender would have less of an incentive to continue it. If he or she dropped out after the making of an order, the court could not subsequently make provision for effectively addressing the drug-using behaviour. 
 Finally, I turn to the hon. Gentleman's question about breaches. The guidance will deal with it and will certainly not propose a policy of ''one breach and you're out''. We all know the difficulties of dealing with this sort of problem, particularly for young people. The underlying aim is to help young people out of their drug problems. Youth offending teams and the specialist drug workers who support them are well used to dealing with young people who have multiple problems, including drug misuse, and will make every effort to encourage and support them through the process. The guidance to the courts and the youth offending teams will make it clear that breach action should be undertaken only as the last resort. The purpose is not to deal with a breach, but to help young offenders out of the drug problems that have a grip on them.

Simon Hughes: I am reassured by the Minister's closing remarks that no assumption of automatic
 breach leading to sanctions will apply. The people who work with youngsters understand that, too. I recognise that the Government have a general public policy interest in dealing with youth offending and drug abuse. I hear what the Minister says about his presumption for voluntary rather than compulsory provision.
 The one unsatisfactory aspect of what the Minister said applies to my examples of sweet-nicking, apple-nicking or pane-of-glass-breaking—small offences that may be committed by someone who, as a juvenile, might have had a recurrent history of sampling solvents or drug abuse. The Minister seems to endorse taking the opportunity of a youngster appearing in court to place him or her in some sort of compulsory regime. That is a draconian step that may be appropriate only as a last resort, but more often than not it is unwise for people of such ages because kids customarily respond better to something that they are working with rather than against. The danger of imposing an order is that it is perceived to be unfair by the youngster because it has nothing to do with his offence. That amounts to a serious objection. 
 I shall not press the amendment to a vote. People reading our proceedings and others will deliberate further on the appropriate triggers for intervention. Imposing orders on young people is a sensitive issue, to which we shall doubtless return later. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 911, in
schedule 17, page 231, line 25, leave out from beginning to 'unless' in line 26.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 912, in 
schedule 17, page 231, line 26, after 'he', insert 
 'has indicated his willingness to comply with treatment, and the appropriate consent to treatment has been obtained'.
 No. 913, in 
schedule 17, page 232, line 38, leave out from beginning to 'unless' in line 26.
 No. 914, in 
schedule 17, page 232, line 39, after 'he', insert 
 'has indicated his willingness to comply with treatment, and the appropriate consent to treatment has been obtained'.

Simon Hughes: This group of amendments deals with the willingness of the person in question to comply with—effectively to consent to—the treatment. Subsection (4D)(b) requires consent
''in the case of an order made or to be made in respect of a person aged 14 or over''.
 I would apply that requirement for consent to youngsters in general. I am conscious that we have debated who consents for whom, at what stage a parent consents, and whether, if a parent or guardian is not available and no consent is given, an order can still be made against the youngster. 
 The amendments reflect the concerns that have been expressed to me by organisations concerned with the welfare of children, as well as reflecting my own, that we should try in every circumstance to obtain the consent of the young person. Whether somebody is aged 13 or 15, the precondition for the success of any such treatment is that the young person has agreed to be a partner in it. Crossing the line to something that does not have consent, and is thus seen to be coercive, may create a difficulty in that it would produce a counter reaction from the youngster. Gaining consent has the extra advantage of the youngster's understanding that there might be a sanction for the breach of the order. He would accept that sanction more readily than if he had not agreed to the order and did not consider it justified. 
 We have discussed what constitutes consent to that age group. Do we mean consent by the youngster, or consent exercised on his behalf? If the person is in care, should the local care worker or the foster parent give consent? Can the Minister elaborate on that? These are probing amendments, designed to ensure that we do not start marking up young people as the subject of orders. 
 My last question is to do with the criminal record. If a youngster breaks the window or nicks the apples and ends up in court where he receives a drug treatment and testing order by virtue of the court order, how long will that remain on his record? Can he at any stage seek to remove it? In what circumstances can it not be erased under the rehabilitation of offenders process? 
 In court, criminal records follow people, even though they might not apply in the civil world. My concern is that, as youngsters go through all sorts of adolescent difficulties, it is perfectly proper for them to be subject to social inquiry reports and, later, to probation reports. Such orders are less proper for criminal records for adults. It might be wrong to record a problem that had nothing to do with the offence, because that might prejudice a later sentencer should the individual commit an offence that indeed has to do with drugs or alcohol. Will the Minister say how far such records once on the books will inescapably follow the individual into adult life?

Hilary Benn: I am not sure what answer the Criminal Records Bureau would offer, but I am happy to undertake to find out and to write to the hon. Gentleman. I am grateful to him for raising the difficult issue of consent, and I recognise the probing nature of the amendments. Under the schedule, consent simply to the attachment of a treatment requirement to the order is required—not consent to the treatment itself. For example, if a medical intervention is proposed as part of the treatment order, that would require consent. Therefore, giving consent to the treatment requirement in general does not presuppose consent to the individual elements, such as the medical ones that I mentioned.
 Having reflected on the matter, we feel that it is sensible to require the consent of those aged 14 and above to the inclusion of a treatment requirement, not least for the simple reason that those young people should be engaged in the decision-making process as 
 actively as possible. If they have given their consent, the likelihood that they will wish to participate increases, because they have put something into the process. All the lessons demonstrate that an individual's positive engagement in compliance will increase the chances of a successful process. Without that compliance and engagement, the process is likely to be less successful, for obvious reasons. One must make a judgment on where the cut-off point should be. Offenders over the age of 14 are much more likely than younger offenders to be able to understand what it means to be asked to give consent.

John Mann: The issue of offenders preferring to give consent does not have any evidence base, and I hesitate to ask for the Minister's. Offenders who have a drug addiction will, by their nature, already be voluntarily attempting to get off that drug. Offenders have repeatedly made the point to me that the nature of the coercion and the rigour is precisely why DTTOs are popular with them. They demand DTTOs in the same way that later in life they demand prison, because if they could get off, say, heroin voluntarily, they would already be doing so. The coercive nature—

Eric Illsley: Order. The hon. Gentleman is intervening; he is not making a speech. Interventions should be brief.

Hilary Benn: I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes. He refers to DTTOs for the most difficult group of offenders, the early signs of which are encouraging. That does not take away from my general point—it is no more than that—that it is better if one has someone's consent to take part in a process than if one does not. I would not put the point any stronger than that, in responding to the request for a large body of evidence to support that supposition.
 I was just saying that not all 10 to 13-year-olds will be mature enough to understand the implications of consenting to the inclusion of a treatment provision in the order. In those circumstances—one must draw the line somewhere—it is for the court to determine the maturity of the child and to consider both the child's and the parents' response to the inclusion of the treatment provision. The schedule as drafted provides for the willingness to comply with treatment. Without such willingness, there would be no consent to the inclusion of a treatment requirement in the order. The individual carrying out the treatment would, when necessary, require the individual consent to the treatment to be provided. The precise form of the treatment will not be prescribed in the requirement, so that the treatment regime can be amended to take account of all factors, including those that might arise after the making of the requirement.

Simon Hughes: Again the Minister is in part reassuring. This is a debate in which it is helpful to know that the policy is that there will be consent. I understand the point that the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) made, which is that there are occasions on which youngsters need coercion or encouragement rather than just their voluntary agreement. In my experience it is more often the families of people with drug problems who say, ''I wish they could be locked up, because in that way there is a
 chance that they will get rid of the supply for their habit.'' That also presumes that if someone is locked up the drugs will not be available. In fact, the prison authorities are now getting better at keeping drugs out of prison.
 I do not wish to divide the Committee. The amendments are about how we deal with young people who may have a drugs problem and may need help as well as punishment. We can return to the discussion later, but for now I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 917, in
schedule 17, page 231, line 27, leave out subsections (4E) to (4G).

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 918, in
schedule 17, page 232, line 40, leave out subsections (5) to (8).

Simon Hughes: The Government Whip may be delighted to know that these are the last amendments from our Benches this afternoon.
 This is the third set of amendments to the schedule and relate to another aspect of treatment: the action plan and supervision orders. If anyone does a degree in social work after this, I assume they will have to know what all the different variants on the theme are, and what can be asked for, recommended or received. I hope that we manage to get fewer titles of orders rather than a whole range of things. 
 It seems to me that the courts often—the hon. Member for Woking will know more about this than I do—have to spend a huge amount of time working out which of many options are available, only to find that in many parts of the country they are not available. 
 The amendments are primarily probing amendments. We suggest that it is not necessary to have the additional testing requirements under this type of authority when a treatment requirement has already been decided on. The Children's Society and others have put arguments against those additional requirements. The Children's Society believes that 
''these requirements are entirely unnecessary, given that drug testing, where it is believed by professionals to be necessary as part of treatment monitoring, could already be detailed within a treatment plan under the treatment requirement.''
 That seems to me to be logical and intelligible. The schedule seems to be creating a whole additional provision to do something that can already be done. What does this provision allow for that is not provided for by other routes? 
 Moreover, am I right in believing that failure to comply with the suggested provision would result in the potential for breach and its ensuing consequences? What is the implication for the future record of the young person of receiving this sort of order? How long will it remain on a young person's record—will they be lumbered with it for the rest of their lives? 
 The addition of testing requirements to the treatment order suggests that the courts would keep on adding additional qualifications and requirements 
 to the sanctions that they apply to the young person—the society refers to ratcheting up the response to the offence. The more conditions there are, the more likely a breach will be. If there are six conditions, there will, by definition, be six opportunities for a breach. 
 Will the court always ensure that the order is proportionate to the offence and the need? I am troubled by the fact that there is nothing in the Bill to make it proportionate to the offence, and the Minister effectively confirmed that. The offence could be very minor, but a whole series of orders and requirements could be imposed. The youngster could be assessed as needing them, even though he had barely been in trouble with the law. 
 That raises another problem. The more a youngster feels—to use a phrase from elsewhere—cabined, cribbed, confined and hemmed in by restrictions, the more unlikely he is to comply. As the Minister said, a voluntary agreement, which has the youngster's consent, is far more likely to command confidence than something that is imposed. 
 Can the Minister give us a ball-park figure for the number of magistrates courts that would be able to make such orders because treatment facilities exist in their jurisdiction? The National Audit Office and the Audit Commission produced their report on drug treatment services in the middle of last year, and it revealed what all of us knew—that drug treatment is as much of a lottery as much other health treatment. The possibility of making orders is therefore entirely conditional on whether there is treatment and a vacancy in that part of the world. It is no good telling youngsters what one often tells adults—that they need treating, but that they must come back in nine months. A 14-year-old who needs treatment is an entirely different creature from a 15-year-old who returns after nine months, having moved on hugely through life experience. What information do we have about the availability of such services? 
 When courts consider such matters, as juvenile courts often do, how up-to-date is their information? The courts will do the best they can, and magistrates and district judges will have inquiries made. It may take a while, but they will wait for the social inquiry report and talk to a probation officer, if there is one. Often, however, the answer that comes back from those involved is, ''We may be able to get someone in here, and there may be a place there. We're not sure.'' Cannot the necessary data be computerised? I have never understood why we cannot make such data available in this day and age. Data about residential, non-residential, site-specific, voluntary, compulsory, hospital, health centre or voluntary sector facilities for young and old people could be made available day to day and updated so that we know what capacity there is. Juvenile courts spend a huge amount of time trying to find appropriate treatment, and the famous IT systems in the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Home Office could come to the rescue if they are up to the job, although they have not been so far.

Hilary Benn: May I deal first with the availability of treatment? As the hon. Gentleman will have noticed,
 new subsection (4D) acknowledges his point. We dealt with the issue earlier, and it clearly makes no sense to operate the policy if appropriate treatment arrangements are not available to the courts. That is taken as read.
 The schedule allows a testing requirement to be included in an action plan order or supervision order in respect of offenders aged 14 or above. That mirrors the testing provisions in section 53 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 on drug treatment and testing orders. 
 Moreover, that is wholly consistent with the provision in clause 10 to test those aged 14 and over in police custody; the provision in clause 145 to test them pre-sentence; and the provision in clause 239 to test them after they have been released on licence. Those clauses have already been ordered to stand part of the Bill. The reason for testing to be included in an action plan order or a supervision order is the same as for those other circumstances: it is important to be able to identify whether an offender has used illegal drugs, so that every assistance can be given to help him deal with his drug use. Although the requirement allows for testing for any drug, tests will in practice focus on identifying class A drug use, as happens at present with drug treatment and testing orders. We all understand why that should be the case. 
 To allow a testing requirement to be included assists the responsible officer or treatment provider to ascertain whether the offender is receiving effective treatment. The hon. Gentleman will have noticed that a testing requirement has not been included for offenders aged 10 to 13 years, because their drug use tends to relate to drugs other than class A drugs. 
 The treatment will be made available through local drug action teams. They are charged with developing substance misuse plans for young people as part of their focus on the most vulnerable. We have been round the houses on that argument: if we think that it is sensible to give help and support to youngsters who are in the grip of drugs, it is appropriate, at the different stages of the process, to make provision for testing in order to be able to see whether the programme is working. We should view the schedule in that modest but important light.

Simon Hughes: I understand what the Minister says. Can he deal with my question about the availability of information to the court? I understand that that information must be available in the area. However, there is a practical problem. Is there a way in which that information could be correlated? Are there plans for a streamlining of information in a way that would be readily accessible?

Hilary Benn: I will write to the hon. Gentleman.

Simon Hughes: Another promise of another missive. I shall add it to the stack that makes up the ancillary documents for this Committee. All are gratefully received.

Hilary Benn: Or the hon. Gentleman could ask a parliamentary question.

Simon Hughes: Indeed.
 I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That this schedule be the Seventeenth schedule to the Bill.

John Mann: Unfortunately, I was unable to comment last week on the issue of drugs testing. It is slightly unfortunate that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey used the orchard analogy, because there are many orchards in my constituency. I assure him that scrumping of apples is not the problem when it comes to offenders—including new offenders—with a class A drug addiction.
 Young people with a heroin addiction overwhelmingly believe that coercion is required. Time after time, I speak to people who say that if they could get off heroin they would do so of their own volition. Heroin is a loser's drug. It is an addictive opiate. Indeed, those people's attitude contrasts with those on crack cocaine, whose users' general experience is that they enjoy being on it. They certainly enjoy some of the edge that goes with the addiction. Only a small number of heroin addicts are comfortable, cosy and happy to be on heroin. They seem to be the slightly older, or sometimes much older, addicts rather than the younger addicts who suddenly find themselves addicted after experimenting. The nature of coercion is essential in terms of treatment. Even a country allegedly as liberal on drugs as the Netherlands sees coercion as the model when it comes to drugs testing and treatment. The people who have been the proponents of cannabis cafés are also the greatest advocates of coercion in relation to class A drugs. I make no comment on the cannabis debate, but that observation on class A drugs is interesting and vital if we are to get on top of the problem. 
 My other points relate to new subsections (4C) and (4D). In line 9 in new subsection (4C), the word ''at'' is used. I referred to that word earlier in our proceedings—it says much about how we see drugs treatment. The word in my mind, which I hope the Minister will reflect on in coming days, is ''by''. The concept of having to go somewhere for drugs treatment lends itself to the drugs treatment being in the secondary, rather than the primary health care sector. Again, however, there is overwhelming evidence from France, the Netherlands and Sweden that intervention through the primary health care sector is fundamental to tackling the drugs problem. 
 I will not elaborate on that point, because I have today tabled another 20 written questions to the Home Office on precisely this issue, so that people can contemplate it. However, the fact that GPs are not expected or, often—including in my area—encouraged or allowed to get involved in the treatment of drug offenders is totally nonsensical. There is no evidence base anywhere to suggest that such involvement is a worse option, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that it is far more effective. 
 I return to what I have crudely, and perhaps wrongly, described as the probation-led nature of drugs treatment in this country. The Home Office's perception of drugs treatment is wholly wrong. One 
 cannot go to some distant establishment and be treated and cured. That is not in the nature of heroin addiction. However, four key forms of treatment could be given. One is methadone maintenance, which is used in the Netherlands. That does not cure people, but stabilises them. The second form of treatment is psychotherapy, which tends to be residential. The other two forms of treatment are buprenorphine and naltrexone. There is evidence from France and Portugal about their effectiveness, but they are not offered. 
 New subsection (4D)(a)(i) refers to treatment only where ''arrangements . . . can be made''. Well, arrangements can be made if GPs are allowed to get involved in treatment. With the Blackpool Tower project, there was a 40 per cent. reduction in crime within six months. That was achieved with a single GP using only one of the four forms of treatment and dealing with everyone who was arrested. That pilot is working. The same principle has been applied in the Netherlands for 30 years and has worked there. Heroin addicts in the Netherlands are not involved very much in crime, whereas heroin addicts are responsible for the vast majority of crime in some of our communities. 
 To build into the legislation a get-out clause that gives rise to the feeling that treatment is not and cannot be available is not right. It is not more money that is needed in treatment services. The money that is there needs to be spent effectively. The Home Office needs to wake up to that.

Joan Humble: As my hon. Friend has mentioned the Blackpool Tower project, will he accept that a key reason why the project has been so successful is that it involves joint working between the police, the health service and voluntary organisations in a non-threatening environment that gives people the support they need?

John Mann: I endorse what my hon. Friend says. In Blackpool, treatment takes place within 24 hours. What is the difference between Blackpool and the rest of the United Kingdom? If treatment can be provided in Blackpool in 24 hours, by one GP, why cannot that happen in the rest of the country? The answer is that it can. We need a rethink of how we perceive treatment as part of our drugs strategy.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Schedule 17 agreed to. 
 Clause 244 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 18 - Summary offences no longer punishable

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 848, in
schedule 18, page 233, line 19, at end insert— 
 'The offence under section 3 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 (c.83) (idle and disorderly persons) of causing or procuring or encouraging any child or children to wander abroad, or place himself or herself in any public place, street, highway, court, or passage, to beg or gather alms.'

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 731, in 
schedule 18, page 233, line 20, leave out paragraph 1.
 Government amendments Nos. 849 to 851. 
 Amendment No. 732, in 
schedule 18, page 234, line 9, leave out paragraph 8.
 Government amendment No. 852. 
 Amendment No. 733, in 
schedule 18, page 234, line 27, leave out paragraph 14.
 Government amendments Nos. 853 to 864. 
 Amendment No. 734, in 
schedule 19, page 242, line 9, leave out paragraph 4.
 Government amendments Nos. 865 to 874, 839 to 844, 875 to 890 and 845 to 847. 
 Government new schedule 3—Enabling powers: alteration of maximum penalties etc.

Hilary Benn: The purpose of amendments Nos. 848 to 862, 875 to 887, 889 and 890 is to make the necessary changes to lower the maximum penalties for certain summary only offences, so that they may be compatible with the new sentencing framework. Once the new sentences are introduced, a full sentence of custody plus, which will replace all short custodial sentences currently available with a maximum of 51 weeks, will be the shortest maximum custodial sentence. Therefore, all summary only offences that carry a maximum penalty of, for example, one month or three months, will have to have their maximum penalty either raised to 51 weeks, so that a sentence of custody plus may be passed, or lowered so as to lose the custodial penalty.
 In essence, the amendments make the necessary changes to remove the option of a custodial penalty for certain summary offences. That will mean that the new maximum penalty for those offences will be either a fine or the new generic community sentence, or a combination of both. All the offences to which the amendments apply are minor. Many are regulatory in nature. None of the offences involves cruelty to animals, the welfare of children, serious public health or safety issues or violent or sexual conduct. Maximum penalties for offences concerning such behaviour have been raised to retain a custodial penalty. 
 Amendments Nos. 863 to 874 are intended to make the necessary changes to the maximum penalties for certain summary only offences, again so that they can be compatible with the new sentencing framework. 
 Amendments Nos. 839 to 847 and new schedule 3 make the necessary drafting changes for a new schedule. There is provision for offences created under certain enabling powers to be made compatible with the new sentencing framework. Those are listed under clause 247. We thought that it was better to list the powers in the schedule. The amendments will add to the schedule relevant enabling powers that have been identified since the Bill was drafted.

Humfrey Malins: None of my amendments will be pressed to a vote. We are dealing with summary offences no longer punishable with imprisonment, and I am mildly sorry that some offences will no longer qualify even for short prison sentences.
 The amendments draw attention to three topics. The offence under section 4 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 of causing or allowing persons under 16 to be used for begging is a very nasty offence. The Minister said that none of the offences involve the welfare of children. I gently suggest that that is exactly what that offence does. It is often committed in London and it is a nasty business where a nasty grownup persuades a youngster—very young—to do the begging. If we want to clear that from the streets, it is pointless to impose a £50 fine because the person will not pay it. It is pointless imposing a community penalty, because they probably have no address anyway. The result will be useless. 
 What sanction is possible in the real world against someone who commits a nasty offence like getting a young child to beg? How can it be driven from the streets? Imposing a fine of £25 will just mean an unpaid fine. There is no appropriate sentence for persistent offending of this kind but a short custodial sentence. The same goes for begging under the Vagrancy Act 1824 in paragraph 1. 
 Some might say that the offence under section 2 of the Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 1860 of ''making a disturbance'' in churches, chapels and churchyards was not too serious. However, at one stage in our history it was extremely serious. Indeed, some might say that it should still be treated as being serious. The Act states: 
''Any person who shall be guilty of riotous, violent, or indecent behaviour''—
 indecent in this case does not bear its modern meaning— 
''in England or Ireland in any cathedral church, parish or district church or chapel of the Church of England and Ireland''—
 I venture to suggest that it should apply to any place of worship— 
''or in any chapel of any religious denomination, or in England in any place of religious worship duly certified under the provisions of the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855, whether during the celebration of divine service or at any other time, or in any churchyard or burial ground, or''—
 this critical point is not mentioned in the schedule— 
''who shall molest, let, disturb, vex, or trouble, or by a any other unlawful means disquiet or misuse any preacher duly authorized to preach therein''
 would be liable to imprisonment for up to two months. 
 Labour Members will be most interested to see that that Act was last used in 1968 on a matter of some importance. Notes from the 1968 case tell us that 
'' 'Indecent' has no sexual connotation and accordingly 'Oh you hypocrites, how can you use the word of God to justify your policies?' shouted after the Foreign Secretary had read a passage from Micah 4 at a service specially arranged and televised for a Labour party conference in a Methodist church, with other protests against the Government's foreign policy, preventing the Prime Minister from reading Matthew 7, 17–29, was an offence despite expert evidence by the Reverend Lord Soper that the spirit of Methodism comprehended contentious disputation in church and a robust reaction to a politically provocative service''.

Simon Hughes: This is such good stuff that I was hoping that the hon. Gentleman would read another three pages of it. I think that I am right to say that John Knox was involved in the case previous to that, but another case was when my first by-election opponent was charged with disrupting a sermon given by the Archbishop of Canterbury. I seem to remember that he may not have been convicted, or that he was given an absolute discharge.

Humfrey Malins: That was most helpful. I shall not stray any further. Hon. Members have been patient. Custody many not be needed for that offence today, but it used to be a serious offence. I can foresee certain circumstances in which it might be used, unless they are covered by the Public Order Act 1986. However, I remain of the view that using children to beg can be nasty, and I cannot think of a better way of dealing with it than a short custodial sentence.

Hilary Benn: Well.

Simon Hughes: Were you at the service?

Hilary Benn: I do not think that I was. I would be interested to find out who were Foreign Secretary and Labour Prime Minister at the time. I do not know whether the Chamber of the House would constitute a place of worship and whether that offence would extend to MPs.

Paul Clark: The provisions referred to by the hon. Member for Woking might allow hon. Members to preach in the Chamber and be listened to.

Hilary Benn: My hon. Friend suggests that if it did extend to MPs when they were preaching, they should be listened to. We shall certainly reflect on the point, and we are grateful for the genuinely interesting history lesson.
 In relation to using children for begging, other legislation is in place for some of the offences for which we would allow the penalty. It might be possible to use provisions such as obtaining property by deception or burglary to deal with vagrancy offences—it would depend in the nature of the vagrancy. Returning to child begging, if the child is suffering ill-treatment or neglect the parents could be prosecuted under the various Children Acts. Alternatively, if the child was not being ill-treated, a community sentence with directive rehabilitation support could be a better way of dealing with the offence while keeping the family together. It depends entirely on the circumstances. I understand the spirit in which the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey made his argument, and I hope that although I cannot match his knowledge of history, I have been able to satisfy him. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 849, in 
schedule 18, page 233, line 20, leave out 
 'the Vagrancy Act 1824 (c.83)' 
 and insert 'that Act'.
 No. 850, in 
schedule 18, page 233, leave out lines 32 to 34 and insert— 
 'Railway Regulation Act 1842 
 An offence under section 17 of the Railway Regulation Act 1842 (c.55) (punishment of railway employees guilty of misconduct).'.
 No. 851, in 
schedule 18, page 234, line 2, leave out from 'nuisances)' to end of line 3.
 No. 852, in 
schedule 18, page 234, leave out lines 17 to 19 and insert— 
 'North Sea Fisheries Act 1893 
 An offence under section 2 of the North Sea Fisheries Act 1893 (c.17) (penalty for supplying, exchanging, or otherwise selling spirits). 
 An offence under section 3 of that Act (penalty for purchasing spirits by exchange or otherwise).'.
 No. 853, in 
schedule 18, page 234, line 32, at end insert— 
 'Public Health Act 1936 
 An offence under section 287 of the Public Health Act 1936 (c.49) (power to enter premises). 
 Essential Commodities Reserves Act 1938 
 An offence under section 4(2) of the Essential Commodities Reserves Act 1938 (c.51) (enforcement). 
 London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 
 An offence under section 142 of the London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 (c.xcvii) (power of Council and others to enter buildings etc). 
 Cancer Act 1939 
 An offence under section 4 of the Cancer Act 1939 (c.13) (prohibition of certain advertisements). 
 Civil Defence Act 1939 
 An offence under section 77 of the Civil Defence Act 1939 (c.31) (penalty for false statements).'.
 No. 854, in 
schedule 18, page 235, line 9, at end insert— 
 'Civil Defence Act 1948 
 An offence under section 4 of the Civil Defence Act 1948 (c.5) (powers as to land).'.
 No. 855, in 
schedule 18, page 235, line 19, at end insert— 
 'Coast Protection Act 1949 
 An offence under section 25(9) of the Coast Protection Act 1949 (c.74) (powers of entry and inspection).'.
 No. 856, in 
schedule 18, page 236, line 37, at end insert— 
 'Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961 
 An offence under section 12(1) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961 (c.50) (restriction of disclosure of information).'
 No. 857, in 
schedule 18, page 237, line 24, at end insert— 
 'Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 
 An offence under section 16 of the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 (c.12) (cancellation of registration of society). 
 An offence under section 48 of that Act (production of documents and provision of information for certain purposes).'.
 No. 858, in 
schedule 18, page 238, line 5, at end insert— 
 'An offence under section 69 of that Act (false statements to obtain grants etc).'.
 No. 859, in 
schedule 18, page 239, line 8, leave out paragraph 65.
 No. 860, in 
schedule 18, page 239, line 10, leave out 'that Act' and insert 
 'the Civil Aviation Act 1982 (c.16)'.
 No. 861, in 
schedule 18, page 239, line 32, at end insert— 
 'Town and Country Planning Act 1990 
 An offence under paragraph 14(4) of Schedule 15 to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (c.8) (wrongful disclosure of information).'
 No. 862, in 
schedule 18, page 240, line 14, leave out paragraph 78 and insert— 
 'An offence under section 105 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (c.5) (failure of person to maintain himself or another).'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Schedule 18, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 19 - Increase in maximum term for

Amendments made: No. 863, in 
schedule 19, page 241, leave out lines 18 to 27 and insert— 
 'Railway Regulation Act 1840 
 In section 16 of the Railway Regulation Act 1840 (c.97) (obstructing officers or trespassing upon railway), for ''one month'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 864, in 
schedule 19, page 241, leave out from beginning of line 28 to end of line 7 on page 242.
 No. 865, in 
schedule 19, page 242, line 10, at end insert— 
 'Regulation of Railways Act 1889 
 In section 5 of the Regulation of Railways Act 1889 (c.57) (avoiding payment of fares, etc.),in subsection (3), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''. 
 Witnesses (Public Inquiries) Protection Act 1892 
 In section 2 of the Witnesses (Public Inquiries) Protection Act 1892 (c.64) (persons obstructing or intimidating witnesses), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 866, in 
schedule 19, page 242, line 14, at end insert— 
 'Emergency Powers Act 1920 
 In section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1920 (c.55) (emergency regulations), in subsection (3), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 867, in 
schedule 19, page 242, line 26, at end insert— 
 'House to House Collections Act 1939 
 In section 8 of the House to House Collections Act 1939 (c.44), in subsection (2), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 868, in 
schedule 19, page 246, line 10, leave out from beginning to '(investigation' and insert— 
 '(1) The Civil Aviation Act 1982 (c.16) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In section 44 (offences relating to the power to obtain rights over land), in subsection (10), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''. 
 (3) In section 75'.
 No. 869, in 
schedule 19, page 246, line 12, at end insert— 
 'Anatomy Act 1984 
 In section 11 of the Anatomy Act 1984 (c.14) (offences), in subsection (6), for ''3 months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 870, in 
schedule 19, page 248, line 16, leave out paragraph 41 and insert— 
 'In section 112 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (c.5) (false representations for obtaining benefit etc.),in subsection (2), for ''3 months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 871, in 
schedule 19, page 248, line 34, at end insert— 
 'London Local Authorities Act 1995 
 In section 24 of the London Local Authorities Act 1995 (c.x) (enforcement), in subsection (1), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 872, in 
schedule 19, page 249, line 10, at end insert— 
 'Government of Wales Act 1998 
 In section 75 of the Government of Wales Act 1998 (c.38) (witnesses and documents: supplementary), in subsection (3)(b), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 873, in 
schedule 19, page 249, line 13, at end insert— 
 'Greater London Authority Act 1999{**qc**} 
 In section 64 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (c.29) (failure to attend proceedings etc), in subsection (2)(b), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'.
 No. 874, in 
schedule 19, page 250, line 13, at end insert— 
 'Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
 In section 137 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c.41) (offences relating to the disclosure of information), in subsection (2)(a), for ''three months'' there is substituted ''51 weeks''.'—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question proposed, That this schedule, as amended, be the Nineteenth schedule to the Bill.

Simon Hughes: On a point of order, Mr. Illsley. I think that we are still on schedule 18, unless you rule otherwise.

Eric Illsley: The Committee just agreed to schedule 18. We are on schedule 19.

Simon Hughes: In that case, I want to make a contribution on schedule 19.
 The schedule follows on from clause 244, which in principle is fine. It extends the term of imprisonment for all offences detailed in schedule 19 to 51 weeks to fit in with the new arrangements for custody plus. I appreciate that they become maximum sentences, but I do not know whether Committee members have picked up that we are now about to agree to increase the maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences significantly. Some increases appear to take the maximum term to a very high level. 
 I will give the Committee a few examples. Offences under section 3 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 currently carry a maximum term of imprisonment of one month, but the proposal is to increase the term effectively to one year. Section 4 offences carry a maximum penalty of three months, which is again increased to almost 
 one year. The current penalty for being found drunk under the Licensing Act 1872 is a maximum prison sentence of a month, but the Bill proposes to increase that to 51 weeks, which is just under one year. Under the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, the penalty for indecent exposure gets the same increase. 
 Paragraph 5 covers the offence of being drunk in charge of a child, which is arguably more serious, and it could be seen as more logical for the penalty to be increased to one year's imprisonment. One final example is in paragraph 38. We have debated football hooliganism legislation several times in recent years. The current punishment for unauthorised attendance at football matches is a maximum of a month in jail. The Bill will mean that if someone now attends a match after they have been banned, they will risk going to prison for a year. 
 At a stroke, we will end up with considerably increased prison sentences. That is logical in that it fits in with the Government's plans, but the changes would be better dealt with by other means. I have a question and proposition for the Minister. My question is whether it is possible to keep the maximum prison sentences at lower levels, such as one month, without breaking the spirit or intention of the custody plus and custody minus arrangements. If so, can we reconsider whether some of the offences would be better governed by those arrangements if we kept to the lower maximum prison sentences? My proposition is that, however we proceed today, we should return to the question. No widespread consideration has been given to the fact that the schedule will mean that a raft of offences—it refers to 51 different Acts, some of which list more than one offence—will carry the possibility of much higher terms of imprisonment. 
 I appreciate that the maximum sentence will not always be imposed and that there will not inevitably be an increase, but we should reflect on the point made by the hon. Member for Woking. The danger is that if there is a higher maximum term, the courts will either impose it or move towards it. Although the last schedule followed reasonable arguments for reducing the number of punishments that include a prison option, with one or two exceptions that the hon. Gentleman noted, there is not the same argument for increasing at a stroke the punishments for 50-odd offences so that they all potentially get a year's imprisonment. 
 Is the theory behind the schedule that every offence on the statute book that carries a maximum period of imprisonment of less than 51 weeks will be upped to 51 weeks? Is it an across-the-board proposal, and if so, is it not illogical to say that a maximum period of imprisonment cannot be by law less than 51 weeks? That strikes me as a strange threshold. I may be wrong, and many remaining offences may have a maximum term of imprisonment of nine, six or three months or a week. It would be helpful to know how the law will stand if we agree to the schedule. The changes are significant.

Graham Allen: Will the Minister say whether the Sentencing Guidelines Council, which is created by another part of the Bill, will run any future changes similar to the massive changes in schedules 18 to 20?
 Will the council have any influence in such important areas?

Hilary Benn: Dealing with the last question first, sentences are laid down in statute, and it is for Parliament to determine sentences and the appropriate maximum penalties. It is then for the courts to interpret statute and apply appropriate penalties. The Sentencing Guidelines Council's work will be to assist the courts in doing that.
 The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey will know that, because of the introduction of custody plus, there will be no such thing as a maximum sentence of one month's custody. The custodial period under custody plus is a minimum of two weeks' custody and a maximum of three months. He said that the schedule will result in potential periods of custody of up to 51 weeks, but that is not what custody plus provides for, as he knows full well. I accept that the schedule is a clear consequence of custody plus. All offences must fit in that framework, and we have made a judgment in putting offences on either side by downgrading some and increasing others. 
 Summary offences that currently carry a penalty of six months will increase to a term of 51 weeks. Of those currently carrying a penalty of less than six months, some will increase to 51 weeks, which is done in schedule 19, and others will be downgraded to non-custodial penalties, which is done in schedule 18. None will be left as they are, and we intend to cover everything. If we have missed anything, an order-making power exists to try to deal with that, which answers the hon. Gentleman's other point. I do not believe for a second, because I have great confidence in the common sense of the courts, that the consequence of making the changes is that suddenly, the day after the Bill comes into effect and the schedule starts to operate, the sentences that are handed down will be any different from those that are given now. That will not change, but the framework within which the offences sit is being changed to take account of the existence of custody plus. It is no more and no less than that.

Simon Hughes: I understand the Minister's argument. However, he is creating a strange anomaly in that there will not be anything for which the maximum period of imprisonment is less than 51 weeks. The gradated differences that have existed will disappear. I appreciate that custody plus means that the sentence is divided between inside and outside. It has the advantage of simplicity, in that there are lots of non-imprisonable offences, some imprisonable ones for which the maximum is 51 weeks, and then the more serious ones, but it takes away the gradations of severity, so we lose the signals as to degrees of seriousness. That could be a disadvantage.
 Schedule 19, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clauses 245 and 246 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 247 - Enabling powers:

Amendments made: No. 839, in 
clause 247, page 135, line 25, leave out subsections (1) and (2).
 No. 840, in 
clause 247, page 136, line 27, at end insert— 
 '( ) Schedule (enabling powers: alteration of maximum penalties etc.)(which amends the maximum penalties which may be imposed by virtue of certain enabling powers) shall have effect.'.
 No. 841, in 
clause 247, page 136, line 29, leave out 'subsections (1) and (2)' and insert 
 'Schedule (enabling powers: alteration of maximum penalties etc.)'.
 No. 842, in 
clause 247, page 136, leave out line 34.
 No. 843, in 
clause 247, page 136, line 35, at end insert 
 'or 
 ( ) Schedule (enabling powers: alteration of maximum penalties etc.),'
 No. 844, in 
clause 247, page 136, line 37, leave out 
 'those subsections or that order' 
 and insert 'that order or Schedule'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 247, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Heppell.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at two minutes to Six o'clock till Thursday 13 February at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.